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Abstract
Personal data are often collected and processed in a decentralized fashion, within
different contexts. For instance, with the emergence of distributed applications,
several providers are usually correlating their records, and providing personal-
ized services to their clients. Collected data include geographical and indoor
positions of users, their movement patterns as well as sensor-acquired data that
may reveal users’ physical conditions, habits and interests. Consequently, this
may lead to undesired consequences such as unsolicited advertisement and even
to discrimination and stalking. To mitigate privacy threats, several techniques
emerged, referred to as Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PETs for short.
On one hand, the increasing pressure on service providers to protect users’ pri-
vacy resulted in PETs being adopted. One the other hand, service providers
have built their business model on personalized services, e.g. targeted ads and
news. The objective of the paper is then to identify which of the PETs have the
potential to satisfy both usually divergent - economical and ethical - purposes.
This paper identifies a taxonomy classifying eight categories of PETs into three
groups, and for better clarity, it considers three categories of personalized ser-
vices. After defining and presenting the main features of PETs with illustrative
examples, the paper points out which PETs best fit each personalized service
category.
Then, it discusses some of the inter-disciplinary privacy challenges that may
slow down the adoption of these techniques, namely: technical, social, legal and
economic concerns. Finally, it provides recommendations and highlights several
research directions.
Keywords: Privacy Enhancing Technologies, recommendation services,
web-search engines, pervasive applications, location-based services,
profile-based services, cryptographic trends, secure communications,
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anonymous certification, private information retrieval, secure multi-party
computation, homomorphic encryption, trust models
1. Introduction
Technology’s advances, namely the development of cloud infrastructures,
Internet of Things (IoT) applications and social networks, have dramatically
increased the amount of collected, stored and processed personal data. Indeed,
the US International Data Corporation (IDC) predicts that worldwide data
creation will increase to an enormous 163 zettabytes (ZB) by 2025 [1]. In fact,
independently from users’ attitudes towards technology, they inevitably release
sensitive and personal information either by fulfilling a job application form, by
purchasing a fidelity card, by passing through a toll-road or by using a credit
card. In addition, the increasing number of connected objects is becoming
trendy and is fiercely present in users’ daily lives, from smartphones stuffed
with applications exploiting location, time and other context parameters to
home applications and from smart clothes to connected accessories (i.e., self
quantified devices) obtaining sensed data, such as wearable sensors monitoring
fitness activities, sleep disorders as well as motion patterns.
In parallel, personalized services emerged. That is, users may enjoy a va-
riety of targeted recommendations, such as points of interest, movies, books,
doctors, practitioners, agencies, routes, · · · , regrettably at the expense of their
privacy. Thus, people today are living in the era where everything is connected,
thus continuously generating, acquiring and processing a huge amount of data.
These collected information may be improperly used, leading to undesired ad-
vertisement, identity theft or even discrimination, and several privacy breaches.
Indeed, privacy, generally defined as the right to be let alone under the Ameri-
can law, is becoming more and more a common critical concern [2], mainly with
successive revelations about the abuse of personal data collection and process-
ing, starting from the US NSA spy program, revealed by E. Snowden in May
20131, until the last Cambridge Analytica and Facebook scandal disclosed in
April 20182.
A growing number of users are concerned about the negative consequences
of the massive collection of data, arising from the large-scale monitoring of indi-
viduals’ life, in terms of human rights and societal values [3]. In 2014, a report
titled Big Data and Privacy, is published by the White House to highlight the
challenges for data protection, applied to the personal data collection by perva-
sive systems. In 2016, the European Union (EU) adopted a new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which objective is to effectively ensure the pro-
tection of the data subject, i.e., data owner [4]. In particular, the regulation
clarifies the conditions under which it is compulsory to obtain the consent of the




data and data relating to minors. The GDPR also introduces the new obligation
of accountability for organizations (i.e., data processors and data controllers).
Indeed, each entity processing personal data must be able to demonstrate at
any times that it is complying with the obligations laid down by the GDPR.
To meet these different requirements, several mechanisms, known as Privacy
Enhancing Technologies (PETs), are gaining an expanding interest. They aim
at proposing efficient privacy preserving algorithms, applications, systems and
services in various domains and environments, following the Privacy by Design
paradigm.
Objective of our Paper — This paper focuses on PETs to support per-
sonalized services. At first glance, privacy and personalization may look antag-
onistic, as privacy is in favor of the nondelivery of personal data while service
personalization needs such data to fit users’ profiles. Due to progress in technolo-
gies, e.g., cryptographic functions, data mining and statistics, these apparently
opposing needs can be satisfied through specific PETs.
Our paper classifies PETs into three different groups and eight categories,
according to which entity is mainly involved in the privacy-preserving decision,
i.e., which entity is supporting the main cost for privacy and whether the chan-
nel between the client and the server is affected. As depicted in Figure 1, the
first group, named as user-side techniques, requires end-user to manage his iden-
tity protection by himself by installing specific softwares to control attributes
disclosure up-to the certification of attribute properties. User-side techniques
include two main PETs categories namely, anti tracking technologies and pri-
vacy preserving certification, and two sub-categories, called data perturbation
and Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC), under the obfuscation and privacy
preserving computation categories, respectively. The second group, referred to
as server-side techniques, requires the server to be strongly involved in data pro-
cessing either by anonymizing databases for data sharing or valorization, or by
performing heavy computation over encrypted data at the request of customers.
Server-side techniques contain two categories - the statistical disclosure control
techniques and self-destructing systems, and two sub-categories, namely Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) techniques and homomorphic encryption mecha-
nisms, under the obfuscation and privacy preserving computation categories,
respectively. It is worth noticing that the obfuscation and privacy preserving
computation categories involve both user-side and server-side privacy enhanc-
ing techniques, deployed w.r.t. the system’s design goals. The third group,
named as channel-side techniques, relates to the quality of the channel between
the user and the server - whether it is mediated and/or encrypted - or the
quality of the exchanged data which can be voluntarily degraded. Channel-side
techniques include secure communications and Trusted Third Party approaches.
Each category is presented while defining the provided properties and supported
techniques, tools and cryptographic mechanisms.































































Figure 1: Taxonomy of Privacy Enhancing Technologies
privacy preserving solutions in diverse environments such as cloud computing
[5, 6], fog computing [7] or the Internet of Things (IoT) [8] and more generally,
in any type of computing [9, 10]. Others are focused on privacy challenges asso-
ciated to specific domains, namely e-health applications [11], smart cities [12],
pervasive systems [2], recommendation services [13] and cyber-security technolo-
gies [14].
Only few survey papers [15, 16, 17] covered privacy preserving techniques
for personalized services. In 2007, Kobsa highlighted the tension between the
privacy and personalization [17] and considered three main categories for pri-
vacy preserving personalized-web systems: the first is pseudonomous systems,
the second is client-side personalization mechanisms while the third is called dis-
tribution, encrypted aggregation, perturbation and obfuscation solutions. [17]
also presented useful information practices and discussed privacy laws, industry
and company regulations that sparked a lot of debates during that period. Toch
et al. [15] provided a detailed analysis of privacy risks while considering three
different personalization techniques, namely social-based personalization, be-
havioral profile-based personalization and location-based personalization. The
authors also reviewed privacy enhancing solutions for personalized information
systems and proposed some research directions.
In [18], Parra et al. surveyed privacy metrics, mainly for the data-perturbation
category, they showed that privacy preserving mechanisms generally impact the
data utility and concluded that the problem of quantifying user privacy has to
be more investigated. Later, the same authors presented a review on PETs and
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metrics for personalized information systems [16]. The authors classified PETs
into five groups, namely anti-tracking tools, cryptography-based techniques
while emphasizing Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes, pseudonymous
and anonymous certification systems, users collaboration approaches and data
perturbation techniques.
Position of our paper — Compared to most closely related surveys, our
paper provides a comprehensive overview of privacy challenges and requirements
and highlights the main privacy-personalization trade-offs associated to differ-
ent specific domains and use cases, namely recommendation systems, pervasive
services and web search engines. In addition, a classification of PETs into eight
categories is proposed, as shown in Figure 1. For each category, the paper
describes the provided properties and reviews recent research proposals and in-
dustrial solutions for appropriate use cases. Furthermore, relying on a detailed
comparison between reviewed PETs, we provide an accurate interdisciplinary
discussion, including technical, legal, social and economic aspects, w.r.t. new
emerging EU regulations. Finally,we identify several research directions and
technical trends, namely Artificial Intelligence AI-based algorithms, known as
data intensive algorithms, and Blockchain-based systems that might be of inter-
est for the privacy preserving personalized-services, but with some adaptations
to fit the privacy engineering principles.
Paper organization — Section 2 identifies privacy issues and requirements
and defines three main trust models; and Section 3 gives a categorization of the
main personalized services and applications while highlighting their features.
Categorized services include recommendation services, pervasive applications
and web-search engines. Section 4, Section 5 and Section 6 introduce and review
user-side, server-side and channel-based privacy preserving techniques, respec-
tively. Section 7 provides a detailed comparison between reviewed PETs w.r.t.
involved approaches, supported trust and architectural models, main drawbacks
and suitable applications. Section 8 discusses privacy open issues and research
challenges, while considering the multi-disciplinary approach, before concluding
in Section 9.
2. Privacy Issues and Requirements, and Trust Models for Personal-
ized Services
Pervasive and mobile applications collect a large amount of personal infor-
mation to provide customized services to their clients, hence they also carry a
great potential of privacy risks w.r.t. gathered data usage and access. In the fol-
lowing, we first introduce privacy risks, in subsection 2.1, privacy requirements
in subsection 2.2 and supported trust models in subsection 2.3.
2.1. Privacy Risks
Privacy risks are mainly related to environments, technologies and involved
parties. In [15], Toch et al. introduced a detailed analysis of privacy risks that
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are associated to prominent personalization techniques. Indeed, as pointed out
in a recent report of the European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA) [19], understanding privacy concerns from a technical point of a view,
leads to identify:
(a) collected/processed data that are released and may be considered as sen-
sitive, personal and identifying data,
(b) data that may be used to identify and/or revoke the anonymity of a user,
(c) possible adversaries (i.e., entities that may gain access to personal infor-
mation) which can rely on:
– data being transferred and processed that the adversary has access
to,
– external and background knowledge of the adversary,
– possible collusion with some other actors.
For instance, for health care and well being applications, a large amount of
commonly considered sensitive identifying information are collected, stored and
processed. Obviously, the wearable IoT device has a limitless potential to im-
prove the daily life, by allowing the collection of health information (e.g., with
new FitBit/Vivosport devices recording basic health information). The gath-
ered data can be used to identify disease correlations and support new treatment
options as well as remotely monitor the process of the treatment, however, these
benefits are counterbalanced by the privacy challenges, as the precise identifi-
cation of a particular user and his behavioral patterns is a growing concern.
In addition, with the help of big data analytics and the emergence of AI-
based personalized applications, the accumulated raw data are highly valuable
as specific patterns can be extracted, while eminently increasing the privacy
risks of identifying users. In fact, adversaries’ aim consists on obtaining private
information about the model’s training data or the target model [20, 21]. At-
tacks targeting users’ privacy include (i) inferring whether input samples were
used to train the target model (i.e., membership inference attacks [21]), (ii)
learning global properties of training data (i.e., property inference attacks), or
(iii) covert channel model training attacks. Attacks targeting the model privacy
include uncovering the model details and inferring hyperparameters [22, 20].
2.2. Privacy Requirements
Referring to [23], privacy preservation requirements are defined as follows:
• anonymity — it means the ability of the user to access a resource or ser-
vice without disclosing his identity to third parties. That is, the anonymity
of a user means that he is not identifiable within a set of subjects, known
as the anonymity set.
Several levels of anonymity have been defined in the literature, ranging
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from complete anonymity (i.e., no one can reveal the identity of the user)
to pseudo-anonymity (i.e., the identity is generally not known but can be
disclosed if necessary) to pseudonymity (i.e., multiple virtual identities
can be created and used in different settings).
• data minimization — it is a fundamental feature of privacy preserva-
tion and a GDPR requirement. It requires that service providers collect
and process the minimum amount of information, needed for appropriate
execution of a service or a particular transaction. The goal is to mini-
mize the amount of collected personal information by service providers,
for instance, to reduce the risk of profiling and tracking users.
• unlinkability — this property is essential for user privacy support and
is closely related to the anonymity property. Unlinkability of two or more
Items of Interest (IoIs, e.g., users, messages, actions, · · · ) from an at-
tacker’s perspective means that within the system (comprising these and
possibly other items), the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether
these IOIs are related or not. Unlinkability is divided into two properties
issue-show unlinkability and multi-show unlinkability, as follows:
– the issue-show unlinkability ensures that any information gathered
during users credentials’ issuing cannot be used later to link the proof
of identity to the original credential, during the authentication pro-
cess;
– the multi-show unlinkability guarantees that several presentation to-
kens derived from the same credential and transmitted over several
sessions can not be linked by the service provider.
• unobservability — this property means the undetectability of a user3
against all users uninvolved in an Item of Interest (IoI) and its anonymity
even against the other user(s) involved in that IoI. That is, a user can use
a resource or a service, without being noticed by others. Unobservability
also requires that third parties cannot determine if an operation is running.
2.3. Trust Models
Within the sphere of information systems’ security, the concept of trust is
interpreted as a relation among the different entities that participate in various
protocols. Trust relations are based on evidence established by the previous
interactions of actors within a protocol.
In this survey, we consider three main trust models, focused on data owners
w.r.t. their relations and interactions with other involved actors, defined as
follows:
3Undetectability of an Item of Interest (IoI) from an attacker’s perspective means that the
attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether it exists or not.
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• trusted model — users trust an external entity, generally known as a
Trusted Third Party (TTP) which is in charge of protecting their sensitive
data. Anonymizers and pseudonymizers are the main examples of trusted
model architectures (cf. subsection 6.2). The idea behind these TTP-
based approaches is conceptually simple such that all exchanged messages
between the communicating entities should go through the central entity.
Their main drawbacks are that they come at the cost of infrastructure
and suppose that users are willing to trust other entities. Moreover, third
parties might eventually be forced, for instance by authorities, to reveal
the collected sensitive information they have access to.
• untrusted model — users mistrust any of the involved actors. As users
just trust themselves, it is their own responsibility to protect their pri-
vacy. Examples of mechanisms relying on the assumptions of the untrusted
model are SMC mechanisms and other techniques relying on data pertur-
bation and operating on the user side. That is, users need not trust any
entity but privacy protection comes at the cost of system functionality,
performances and data utility.
• semi-trusted model — trust is distributed among the set of entities,
involved in the execution of the protocols. In this model, the data owner
does not totally trust other peers, i.e., other users, the service provider,
etc.. It is assumed that those peers are honest as they generate accurate
inputs or outputs and perform calculations properly, during the different
steps of the protocol. However, they may be curious to gain extra data
from the protocol, such as obtaining credentials/attributes of a data user,
retrieving an encrypted data content, or distinguishing the data owner
based on several interactions. Several techniques are considered under the
semi-trusted model, such as Private Information Retrieval (PIR) solutions
and Statistical Disclosure Control techniques.
3. Categorization of Personalized Services
To better understand how PET techniques better fit services needs, we first
categorize the main personalized services with some of their features, like the
personalization techniques, the possible adversaries and the type of gathered
data, as shown in Table 1. Subsection 3.1 below introduces different application
categories, their characteristics, specific privacy threats and requirements. Sub-
section 3.2 details the personalization based approaches, namely location-based,
profile-based and content-based techniques.
3.1. Personalized Services, Applications and Systems
As shown in Table 1, three main categories of personalized services are distin-
guished and presented below, i.e., recommendation services, web search engines
and pervasive applications.
8
Table 1: The Main Personalized Services Categories and Features
Category Services Techniques Adversaries Collected Data
profile-based [24] service providers profile
recommendation services online advertisement [25] location-based [26] merchants location
content-based [27] interests
profile-based [28] service providers profile
web search personalized web search [29] location-based [30] third parties location
queries
geo-social network applications [31] location-based [32] service providers location
profile-based [33] other users profile, interests
health care location-based [34] service providers location, activities
pervasive applications and well-being applications [35] profile-based [36] city equipments sensed data
vehicular applications location-based [37] other drivers location, movements’ trace
and smart cities [38] profile-based [39] city equipments driving behaviour
road authorities users’ habits
3.1.1. Personalized Recommendation Services
These services enable users to receive diverse personalized recommendations
with respect to their close interests and profile’s attributes. All along, personal-
ized recommendation systems are becoming effective revenue for online business.
That is, as discussed in [40], personalized recommendations are mainly based
on personal information analysis and they are known to be efficient as 35% of
the consumers are purchasing on Amazon thanks to targeted recommendations,
and 75% of watched contents are recommended on Netflix.
The system model of recommendation services relies on two main entities: the
user and the recommender [13]. User’s personal data are generally stored on his
local device (i.e., smartphone). The recommender collects these data, analyses
and processes the gathered data by creating users’ profiles, interests and prefer-
ences, in order to provide accurate recommendations. These recommendations
may be sent by messages or shown via pop-up windows.
Although these systems are very efficient and useful for each involved entity,
they give rise to several privacy concerns:
(a) collected personal data are inconveniently exposed to the recommending
entity, as they disclose their personal interests and profiles,
(b) collected personal data may be misused by the recommender, which can
for instance, sell these data without the user’s consent [41],
(c) provided data may be disclosed or gathered by attackers, taking advan-
tage of some vulnerabilities at the recommender’s side.
Because users need to reveal information in order to make use of desired
functions of recommendation systems, the idea consists on resolving the hard
-appropriate- balance between utility and users’ privacy. Providing accurate rec-
ommendations remains the main objective of these systems, however massively
collecting personal information may also lead to -irreversible- privacy breaches.
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3.1.2. Personalized Web Search Services
Personalized web search aims at providing customized search results tailored
to users’ interests and general profiles, at the expense of personal users’ data
collection and analysis. That is, data analysis permits to understand the users’
intent behind issued queries, for improving the search quality, known as the
Quality of Experience (QoE) [42].
Personalized Web search solutions are generally categorized into two categories,
namely click-log based methods and profile based methods. The methods based
on the click-log are simple: they mainly rely on the clicked pages based on
the user’s query history. Although it has been shown that this strategy works
consistently [43], it can only work on repeated requests from the same user.
Conversely, the profile-based methods enhance the search experience with com-
plex user-interest models generated from user profiling techniques.
Once again, privacy concerns arise as personal data are heavily and implicitly
collected by Web Search Engines (WSEs):
(a) data leakage, for instance, as already happened with the American OnLine
(AOL) query logs [44], may both regress users’ trust in their providers im-
peding them from using several services, and also mitigate WSE providers’
enthusiasm for providing personalized services, thus harming the whole
business model,
(b) collected personal data may be misused by the service provider, for in-
stance, this latter may sell these data without the consent of the user.
Privacy risks have become the main issue to a large proliferation of person-
alized search services and to the emergence of privacy-preserving WSE initia-
tives, e.g., Qwant 4, DuckDuckGo 5, .... To protect users’ privacy in personalized
WSEs, it is important to address the trade-off between the improvement of the
quality of the search with users’ profile customization utility while hiding and
preventing massive sensitive data collection by service providers.
3.1.3. Personalized Pervasive Services
Pervasive systems include a large variety of applications and services, includ-
ing geo-social network applications, vehicular applications, smart cities’ services
and health care and well-being applications. Most of these services are person-
alized w.r.t. the user movements and precise location. Indeed, end-users are
interested in sharing their location data in terms of check-in based mechanisms,





Let us emphasize that location and time are the main parameters that permit
to precisely determine the context of an interaction. That is, the association of
a user with a specific location at a given time can reveal affiliations, trace move-
ments, deduce habits, interests or even religious beliefs and/or health problems.
Hence, several privacy threats have to be considered:
(a) collected location data permit service providers to trace users’ movements
and determine frequently attended places or even guess places that users
are unlikely visiting (i.e., not preferred places). The location data may
provide interesting information to curious service providers, such that
they may conclude associating events and when/where users have been
together, possibly the frequency and the duration.
(b) releasing personal data (mainly collected from body sensors) to a third
party, without the user consent, undesirably disclose a lot of information
about an individual’s physical condition or even lead to discrimination,
for instance by insurance companies [45],
(c) provided data may be disclosed or gathered by external attackers or in-
truders, mainly while considering that several pervasive mechanisms col-
lect more than strictly needed information for each specific application.
3.2. Personalization based approaches
Personalization techniques combine ideas from user profiling, information
retrieval, artificial intelligence and user interface design, in order to provide
customized services to end-users. Hereafter, we briefly discuss two main per-
sonalization techniques, namely user profile-based, location-based and content-
based techniques.
3.2.1. Personalized profile-based approaches
Generally, a user submits queries to a WSE, clicks on news links in a person-
alized news recommendation system, and assigns tags to resources (i.e., photos,
bookmarks, · · · ), w.r.t. his profile and interests. These information (queries,
clicks, tags) permit the service provider to extract a fine-grained user profile
[18].
Users’ profiles are generally constructed and modeled based on histograms [18].
For instance, for the Google News platform, news are classified into a predefined
set of topics. Subsequently, users are modeled based on their distribution of
clicks within the predefined sets.
3.2.2. Personalized location-based approaches
Based on spatial and temporal data, location-based techniques are becoming
a leading factor for online business. Meanwhile, there exist two different cate-
gories for location-based approaches, namely for providing elementary services
and derivative services [46].
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Elementary services are typically the navigation and search of Point of Interest
(POIs) services. They require continuous reporting of geographical positions for
guiding users. This is the main function of several pervasive systems, like geo-
social networks, and applications such as Google Maps6, Baidu Maps7, Waze8
and AutoNavi Map9.
Derivative services consist mainly of tracking, mobile commerce (i.e., rec-
ommendation services), location-based games and social location-based mobile
applications.
For tracking purposes, the location-based personalization approach records ge-
ographic positions of users and objects and provides trajectories and moves
expressed by an ordered sequence of respective locations (e.g., CityMapper10).
Second, for mobile advertisement based on location, several examples emerged,
such as location-sensitive advertising or billing (e.g., Groupon11 and AdNear12
applications): location based advertisement pushes ads to users associated to
their exact geographical position while location-based billing allows users to con-
sume economically, based on different rating zones, hence, they are charged dif-
ferently based on their location. Finally, new favorites of young people emerged,
namely location-based games, such as PokemonGo13 and social, location-based
applications such as Tinder14.
3.2.3. Personalized content-based approaches
As shown in Table 1, content-based approaches are mainly used for person-
alized recommendation systems. They generally consist on recommending items
while comparing user’s personal preferences and behaviours with the properties
of items. For instance, to propose personalized ads, the advertisement com-
pany, i.e., recommender, may compare the keywords associated with ads, with
the keywords pointing out the user’s preferences. Thus, to obtain these person-
alized recommendations, users are generally required to provide their personal
information, i.e., preferences, location, etc. to the recommender for analysis
and processing.
4. User Side Techniques
User-side privacy preserving techniques include mechanisms that require the
involvement of the end-user to protect his own identity and personal data. In-











a privacy preserving certification system are the main user-oriented PETs, that
permit users to protect their privacy. In the following, we first introduce basic
anti-tracking technologies (subsection 4.1). Then, we present privacy preserva-
tion certification systems (subsection 4.2). Afterwards, data perturbation and
secure multi party computation mechanisms are detailed in subsection 4.3 and
subsection 4.4, respectively.
4.1. Basic Anti-tracking Technologies for Online Services
In this section, we present tracking tools and review anti-tracking technolo-
gies for the application level.
4.1.1. Tracking Tools
Web tracking is a technique that performs certain tasks such as content
personalization, user authentication or online advertising. Its main goal is to
improve the user experience and maintain an Internet economy as highlighted
by most of the Internet advertising companies. Web tracking techniques can
be stateful or stateless, depending on the type of data that are required by the
website and stored at the client side.
• Stateful tracking — it mainly relies on cookies to store information on
users’ computers. That is, a cookie is a thin file containing user informa-
tion such as hashed authentication information, the last visited pages, etc..
A cookie has an expiration date after which it is deleted from the user’s
computer. Its lifetime varies but generally is considered as sufficiently
long. In addition, once a user visits a website, the lifetime of stored cook-
ies is reset to the default duration. This way, websites can maintain the
browsing state that otherwise would be lost. Figure 2 shows the main
interactions between the user’s browser and the web service provider, to
manage first-party cookies.
Nowadays, websites may abuse the stateful nature and advantages pro-
vided by cookies. In fact, websites involve several resources, each one able
to generate cookies. Some of these resources are not necessarily owned by
the hosting website, and these external resources may also include cook-
ies. Indeed, they can certainly gather the user’s browsing history and
profile her browsing habits. For instance, a website bogus.com includes
a resource like an image or a link-list imported from a third-party do-
main like ad.com. When a user visits bogus.com, the third-party resource
generates a cookie that is stored on the user’s computer. As such, when
the same user visits another website too-bogus.com which uses the same
ad.com resource as bogus.com, the third party ad.com recognizes him, as
the related cookie is already stored in his computer.
• Stateless tracking and fingerprinting methods — this method does
not require to store data on users’ computers. The fingerprint-based mech-
anisms mainly rely on extracted properties of users’ browsers. These
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powerful tracking tools are increasingly used by websites, as they per-
mit advertising companies to bypass the private browsing mode as well
as cookie-related regulation in Europe [4]. Fingerprinting techniques are
even more informative to advertising companies than third-party cookies.
They can complete a user profile for identification purpose, even across
several advertising services by sharing fingerprint data between different
services. Thanks to the quick evolution of JavaScript and the huge num-
ber of devices that interpret this language, websites push scripts to the
browser to inspect available and accessible resources of the browser.
4.1.2. Anti-tracking Tools
For the application layer, three aspects of tracking techniques can be coun-
teracted: cookies in general, Java and Flash scripts, and fingerprinting methods.
(1) Request web pages
Request-related cookies are included in the request
(3) Add new cookies for future requests
(4) Load web pages using existent cookies and added cookies.
Web ServerUser
(2) Generate web pages
Figure 2: First-party Cookie Flow Diagram
• Anti-cookies based techniques — cookies can be directly managed at
the user browser or by using a cookie management tool. For instance, a
privacy mode can be activated in the browser leading to disabled browsing
history and reduced local traces (Google Chrome: private mode, Firefox:
private mode, IE: InPrivate). In addition, among browsers, the Do Not
Track (DNT)15 header can be deployed as a Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) header selected field. It ensures that a web application disables
either its tracking or cross-site user tracking (the ambiguity remains un-
resolved) of a requesting end-user. As this technology is not yet stan-
dardized, there is no technical measure to prevent curious web service
providers from maintaining end-users’ tracking. In fact, it is up-to the
15https://donottrack-doc.com/
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website provider to perform honest processing with regard to the DNT
header. Therefore, more efficient techniques have to be used like browser
extensions for preventing cookies, namely third party cookies, Flash cook-
ies etc.. Hereafter, we review most-deployed tools.
First, the Privacy Badger16, introduced by the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation (EFF)17 prevents third party websites from tracking the user, based
on the number of first-party websites embedding third party cookies. Once
a third party domain is identified as tracking end-users across different
sites, it may be blocked. Blocking is launched for instance based on the
number of times the user meets the same tracking domain during his
browsing activities.
Furthermore, AdBlock Plus18 and uBlock19 block all undesirable ads, pop-
up ads that are embedded by default, for example, video ads on YouTube,
Facebook ads or even flashy banners. Both of them are using regular ex-
pressions (RegExp for short) to match against the URLs to contact. If the
match is positive, then the URL is blocked. AdBlock Plus is also able to
identify acceptable ads. It can be configured to block domains known to
spread malwares or to disable any known tracking tools. It also removes
all the social media buttons from each website.
The Disconnect tracker20 provides Private Browsing and Private Search
browser extensions for several web browsers such as Firefox, Chrome,
Opera, etc.. The Private Search feature prevents search engines from
tracking users’ requests, while Private Browsing is responsible for block-
ing trackers by classifying them in blacklists. The Disconnect tracker
provides a user-friendly approach of blocking trackers by only enabling
necessary requests used for loading content. Indeed, Disconnect detects
trackers based on the number of requests they have queried for each user,
and displays them in one of four categories: advertising, analytics, social
and content. Users can re-enable a tracker or whitelist a website manu-
ally using the dashboard in the upper right corner of the Web browser.
Disconnect maintains a database of trackers by crawling popular websites
for third-party requests, and then categorizing those requests by type.
Finally, the Ghostery21 tool blocks tracking cookies installed by default in
the user’s browser. It also enables its users to detect and control JavaScript
”tags” and ”trackers”. JavaScript beacons are embedded in many web
pages, largely invisible to the user, allowing collection of the user’s brows-








forms of tracking such as Canvas fingerprinting22.
• Disabling Java and Flash scripts — several anti-tracking techniques,
mainly browser extensions have emerged to block JavaScript and Flash
scripts. Let us emphasize that fewer than 5% of worldwide websites are
still using Flash scripts and most websites are going ahead of its complete
retirement23.
NoScript24 and ScriptSafe are able to disable all scripts’ types, such as
JavaScript, Java, Flash, etc., from running on visited pages, if they are
not added manually to a whitelist, by the corresponding user. Instead,
Flashblock25 can only block Flash content.
• Counteracting fingerprinting-based techniques — the goal of these
techniques is to share the same fingerprint among several users, in order
to blend in with the masses. For this purpose, it is important to efficiently
determine the fingerprint surface [47], to be able to define a shared finger-
print. That is, fingerprinting can be performed both in a passive and active
form. On one side, the passive fingerprinting uses attributes deduced from
the communication such as the order of HTTP headers. On the other side,
the active fingerprinting run attribute-gathering scripts on the client-side
(e.g., JavaScript engine speed). Consequently, anti-fingerprinting tools
have to take into consideration both forms. Note that the use of browser
extensions such as Disconnect can block cookies but at the same time make
users more unique, thus, more identifiable w.r.t. fingerprinting tracking
techniques.
First, using a tool to disable the execution of Javascripts like NoScript gen-
erally protects users against JavaScript-based fingerprinting techniques.
Another technique against fingerprinting is to use a cookie-blocker like
uBlock to prevent the fingerprint system from accessing some relevant in-
formation, such that attributes inherent in the communication. Finally,
the best method to have an effective fingerprint without decreasing the
anti-tracking status with less browser extensions, is to use The Onion
Router (TOR for short) and NoScript with Tails, as Tails provides ex-
actly the same environment to its users (with TOR and NoScript already
installed).
22Canvas fingerprinting is a type of browser fingerprinting techniques for tracking online
users. It allows websites to uniquely identify and track users using HTML5 canvas elements





Table 2: Summary of Main Tracker-Blocker Tools
Tool Approach Blocking Effectiveness Firefox Users
Ghostery domain-based javascript beacons (+) good protection 1.1 M
tracking cookies
Disconnect request number-based trackers (+) acceptable protection 0.2 M
whitelist (-) fail to block some very popular trackers
Privacy Badger behaviour-based third party trackers (-) ineffective with fresh browser installation 0.5 M
AdBlock Plus RegExp-based ads (+) acceptable protection 11 M
blacklist pop-up ads
uBlock RegExp-based ads (+) acceptable protection 4.9 M
pop-up ads (-) fail to block some very popular trackers
Request Policy cross-site blacklist all third parties (+) good protection 0.09 M
(-) break of web-page rendering
where RegExp refers to Regular Expression and (+) and (-) represent the
advantages and drawbacks of each tracker-blocker tool.
4.1.3. Comparison between Ad-blocker tools
This section gives a comparison between previously presented tracker blocker
tools with respect to the effectiveness and Quality of Experience (QoE) crite-
ria. Referring to the [48] benchmark study conducted in 2017, we consider both
privacy-protection and performance requirements. In [48], different plug-ins
and setups are used as a testbed to browse regular web pages while collecting
navigation data. Each configuration contains one single tracker-blocker from
AdBlock, Privacy Badger, Blur, Disconnect, uBlock, Ghostery and Request
Policy26 tools, while one configuration, referred to as Plain does not contain
any modified setup. Measurement results show that the picture is very diverse,
with no plug-in being able to guarantee complete protection while improving
performance as promised.
By considering the different experimental setups, it is noticeable that the
majority of considered web sites do ignore the European Directive [4]. The di-
rective forbids web services from installing tracking and profiling cookies before
explicit consent is given by the user, but as far as we know, this is not observed
for most of the services. Based on [48], Table 2 presents a comparison between
6 different tracker-blocker tools, with respect to several quantitative and qual-
itative criteria. That is, by Approach, we mean the approach used to detect
and block trackers, including domain-based, Regular Expression based (Reg-
Exp for short), behaviour-based and cross-site based blacklisting. By Blocking,
we introduce resources that may be blocked by each tool, such as: trackers,
ads and third parties. By Effectiveness, we show the advantages and drawbacks
of each reviewed tool, w.r.t. trade-off between users’ privacy preservation and
efficiency. By Firefox Users, we provide the number of Firefox users installing
the anti-trackers27.
From Table 2, it is noticeable that Request Policy tool is offering a good




breaking the web-page rendering. Similarly, Ghostery considered as a handy
Chrome extension/Firefox add-on permits to provide a good protection for end-
users. As stated above, Ghostery removes intrusive ads and blocks trackers,
resulting in a faster browsing experience.
On the other side, Privacy Badger, as an open source browser extension,
blocks more generic behaviors. It ensures a balanced approach between end-
users and content providers by blocking advertisements and tracking cookies
that do not respect the Do Not Track setting in a user’s web browser. That
is, Privacy Badger only blocks those ads which come with embedded trackers.
Unfortunately, its main blocking algorithm used to identify trackers is ineffective
with fresh browser installation. Separately, AdBlock Plus, is the most widely
used tool by Firefox users. It provides an acceptable protection, by using regular
expressions to match against URLs. Whenever the match is positive, the request
is blocked. uBlock and Disconnect also provide an acceptable level of privacy
protection. However, they fail to detect known trackers.
4.2. Privacy Preserving Certification
Privacy preserving certification, also known by privacy preserving attribute
based credentials (AC), are cryptographic mechanisms that allow users to ob-
tain certified credentials for their attributes from trusted issuers, and later de-
rive presentation tokens that reveal only required information satisfying service
providers’ predicates.
In 1982, David Chaum introduced the concept of privacy-preserving certifi-
cation [49]. Later, this promoting idea has been fully formalized by Camenisch
and Lysyanskaya (CL) [50] in 2001. Since then, different concrete constructions
have been proposed and considered as essential elementary units in privacy-
preserving identity-management systems. In fact, relying on AC, each honest
user is able to prove to a requesting SP, that he holds authenticated attributes,
known also as credentials, obtained from trusted issuing authorities. More-
over, AC techniques prevent SPs to -trace- users’ activities based on successive
authentication sessions. That is, the user derives a proof associated to each dif-
ferent access request, such that the SP is not able to link a single received proof
to another or to any information relative to its owner, even in case of collusion
between providers and with the credential issuer. This property, referred to as
multi-show property, has first been formerly presented by CL in [51], allowing a
user to unlinkably prove possession of a credential as many times as necessary.
However, in some applications, this multi-show property is too flexible to be
useful as it limits the fulfillment of required features in some systems such as in
e-voting systems, electronic surveys, etc.
AC techniques attract a lot of interest and full attention of service providers,
thanks to their ability to support the data minimization fundamental feature
[52] which states that data collection should be strictly required compared to
the provided requested service, as explained in subsection 2.2. This interest








































Figure 3: Traditional AC Entities Flow Diagram
Data Protection Regulation [4] and also the U.S. National Strategy for Trusted
Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) [53].
The design of a privacy preserving certification scheme strongly relies on the
use of malleable signature schemes, that provide several interesting properties,
such as the selective disclosure feature and the unforgeability property [54]. In
fact, the selective disclosure property refers to the ability provided to the user
to present to the verifier partial information extracted or derived from his cre-
dential, for instance, to prove he is older than 18 to purchase liquors, while not
revealing his birth date. The unforgeability property ensures that unless a user
possesses a legitimate and certified credential, i.e, secret key, he is not able to
generate a valid authentication proof, i.e, user’s signature over the SP’s access
policy.
In the following, we first introduce main entities and general concepts of AC
schemes. Second, we detail several signature schemes that are presented with
their associated AC schemes.
4.2.1. Definitions
This section defines identified AC’s entities (section 4.2.1) and procedures
(section 4.2.1).
Entities. AC systems rely on some well identified entities. As shown in Figure
3, three main entities are considered as mandatory namely the issuer, the verifier
and the user, while both a revocation authority and the inspector, designed as
optional [55].
Indeed, in an AC system, each user represents a pivotal entity, who aspires
a privacy preserving access to requested services, afforded by service providers,
referred to as verifiers. Each verifier imposes an access control policy, called
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presentation policy, to its resources and services, while enforcing a set of cre-
dentials that have to be owned by the users. To do, each user has first to obtain
credentials from a trusted issuing authority, known by issuer. Then, he selects
the appropriate information (i.e., a sub-set of certified attributes) from the cre-
dentials and shows the selected information to the requesting service provider,
under a presentation token. To effectively generate and accurately verify pre-
sentation tokens, the most recent revocation information have to be gathered
from the revocation authority, by the user, respectively the verifier. That is,
the revocation authority is responsible for revoking issued credentials and main-
taining a list of valid credentials. When revoked, a credential can no longer be
used to derive presentation tokens. The inspector is a trusted auditing entity,
which is able to effectively remove the anonymity of a user when needed.
Procedures. An AC system relies on three main procedures and six randomized
algorithms defined as follows:
• Initialisation Procedure — It includes the following two algorithms:
– Setup — given a security parameter ξ, the algorithm Setup outputs
the public parameters params and the public-private key pair of the
issuer (pkis, skis).
– UserKG — it takes as input j ∈ N (i.e., j corresponds to the user
index) and outputs the public and private keys’ pair (pku, sku)j of
the user j.
• Issuance Procedure — This procedure is an interactive protocol combining
the Issue and the Obtain algorithms as follows:
– Issue ↔ Obtain: the Issue ↔ Obtain protocol corresponds to
the issuance procedure conducted between the issuer and the user.
The Issue algorithm, executed by the issuing entity, takes as input
the public parameters params, the public key of the user pku, the
secret key of the issuer skis, and the set of attributes {ai}Ni=1 (i.e.,
N presents the number of attributes). To receive a credential C, the
user performs the Obtain algorithm which takes as input the public
key of the issuer pkis and the secret key of the user sku.
• Presentation Procedure — This procedure is an interactive protocol com-
bining the Show and the Verify algorithms as follows:
– Show ↔ Verify: the Show ↔ Verify interactive protocol corre-
sponds the presentation procedure conducted between the user and
the verifier. The Show algorithm takes as input the issuer’s public
key pkis, the user’s private key sku, the set of required attributes
{ai}N
′
i=1 and a credential C, w.r.t. the presentation policy, and it
outputs a presentation token. The Verify algorithm, executed by




i=1, and the presentation token. It outputs a bit
b ∈ {0, 1} for success or failure of the verification.
As introduced above, AC systems mainly rely on malleable signatures, namely
Attribute based Signatures (ABS), introduced in subsection 4.2.2, group signa-
tures, presented in subsection 4.2.3, sanitizable signatures, detailed in subsection
4.2.4 and blind signatures, introduced in subsection 4.2.5.
4.2.2. Attribute-based Signatures
Attribute-based Signatures, introduced by Maji et al. in 2010, is a flexible
primitive that enables a user to sign a message with fine grained control over
identifying information [56]. Indeed, each user, holding a set of attributes, has
to obtain a secret key associated with his attributes from a trusted issuing au-
thority. Thus, he is able to sign a message w.r.t. a predicate satisfied by any
subset of his attributes. In the following, we denote an attribute based signature
scheme by ABS.
Definitions. Generally, an ABS scheme involves several entities, namely a Sig-
nature Trustee (ST ), the Attribute Authority (AA), and potentially several
signers and verifiers [57]. The ST is represented by a global entity that is re-
sponsible for generating global system parameters, while the AA is in charge
of issuing the signing keys associated with the set of attributes that each user
(signer) possesses, as depicted in Figure 4. Even though AA knows the signing
keys and users’ associated attributes, it is impossible for a curious AA to iden-
tify which attributes have been used in a given valid signature. Therefore, AA
is unable to assign the signature to his originating user and/or to link several
signatures as generated by the same user. Up to now, several ABS schemes
appeared in the cryptographic literature, based on different design directions.
Indeed, (i) the attribute value can be a binary-bit string [56, 57, 58, 59, 60], or
relies on a particular data structure [61], (ii) access structures may be defined
as threshold policies [58, 59, 60], monotonic policies [56, 61] or non-monotonic
policies [57], and (iii) the attributes’ secret keys issuance can be ensured by a
single authority [59, 56, 61], or a group of authorities [57, 56].
The first security model for ABS schemes was proposed by Shahandashti et
al. [59]. The authors pointed out the main procedures and security properties,
such as correctness, unforgeability and signer-attribute privacy. Afterwards,
Maji et al. [56] and El Kaafarani et al. [62] introduced and formalized the
perfect privacy property which states that a signature should not reveal neither
the identity of the signing user nor the set of attributes used for the signing
procedure.
From Attribute Based Signatures to Anonymous Credential Systems. Several
schemes have been proposed in literature [63, 64, 65, 66]. Most of the proposed
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Figure 4: Attribute Based Signature Flow Diagram
third parties, i.e., merchant web-site, e-assessment platform, dating web-site,
cloud provider, etc. In [63], a new AC framework is presented, based on ABS
while identifying additional requirements for ABS to meet AC features. For in-
stance, a doctor (acting as user) obtains a certified credential (i.e., professional
card) by the Ministry of Health (which plays the role of the issuer) over the set
of his attributes S = {a1 := name; a2 := Rob, a3 := city, a4 := NewYork, a5 :=
doctor, a6 := carcinology}. The whole set of attributes is committed to a single
value using the user public key, and it is signed using the secret key of the issuer,
to derive the resulting credential, referred to as C.
Afterwards, the doctor can, for instance, prove that he is a doctor living in New
York, without revealing his name nor his field of activity. To do so, the signing
access structure is defined as Υ = (doctor ∨ cargeiver) ∧ (city ∧ (NewYork ∨
Tokyo ∨ Paris)). The doctor whose attributes satisfy the access structure is able
to use his credential C to extract the related keys associated to the requested
attributes a3, a4 and a5. As such, the doctor remains anonymous among the
group of doctors living in New York. That is, he can successfully prove the
requested features since the signature of the Health’s Ministry over the doctor’s
attributes is valid.
To meet AC requirements, the construction introduced in [63] ensures the trace-
ability of signatures such that a new inspection procedure has been introduced
to remove anonymity and identify the user originating an ABS signature. Sec-
ond, the unlinkability between issuers has been addressed, relying on a new
issuance procedure. In fact, in ABS schemes, when a user requests multiple au-
thorities to issue private keys with respect to his attributes, issued credentials
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Figure 5: Group Signature Flow Diagram
4.2.3. Group Signatures
Generally, a group signature is a public-key primitive that allows members
of a group to generate signatures on behalf of the group they are belonging to.
As such, any verifying entity can be convinced that the generated signature has
been produced by a legitimate group member, without inferring his real iden-
tity or being able to identify him. In the following, we denote a group signature
scheme by GS.
Definitions. As shown in Figure 5, a GS scheme involves four different roles,
namely the group manager, group members (i.e., signers), an opener and the
verifier. The group manager is responsible for managing the group, by adding
and revoking group members. Note that the group manager can either be a sin-
gle entity or a number of coalitions of several entities (e.g., group members) that
can also play the role of an opener. In fact, a user has first to interact with the
group manager to join the group and receive related secret information. Once
registered, each group member can sign messages on behalf of the group. The
generated signature can then be verified by any entity, called verifier, that is
able to check the correctness of a group signature without identifying the actual
signer. In case of dispute, a designated entity is able, when needed, to open a
signature to identify the actual signer. Thus, group signatures permit to ensure
two main privacy properties, namely, users’ anonymity and accountability.
Group Signatures Applications. Group signatures have been applied in several
use-cases and different settings. For instance, a variant of group signatures con-
stitutes a building block for AC systems, namely Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL)
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signature [50, 51] that was used to build the Idemix system, as presented above.
Generally speaking, a group signature permits anonymous access control. It
may be applied to electronic voting [67, 68, 69, 70] or even anonymous elec-
tronic cash [71, 72, 73]. That is, a voter can anonymously access the polling
place and a payer can anonymously have the right to pay.
As detailed in subsection 4.2.1, an anonymous credential scheme, on the con-
trary, allows to manage several groups at once. For example, a service provider
wanting to offer some special rights to certain categories of its clients, such as
students under 25 or seniors over 60. A group signature would not be relevant in
this case by its own, however, when applied as an anonymous credential mecha-
nism, it may provide the desired service. Indeed, this service provider does not
necessarily need to obtain all the information about the user (name, address,
exact age, etc.) but needs to be sure that these pieces of information (age and
student status) are correct and that they have been certified by a trusted entity
(e.g., the university or the country’s authority). With anonymous credentials
systems, a user needs to register only once in order to belong to several groups
(such as the group of persons being less than 25, the group of French people,
etc.).
Several schemes have been presented in the literature to support anonymous
access [74, 75, 72, 69]. Zheng et al. [75] have proposed a general construction
of linkable group signature (LGS) to achieve anonymity, auditing and tracing
functions for later auditing anonymous communications. (LGS) is differentiated
from group signatures by enabling an authority to reveal whether two signatures
have been generated by the same group member without accessing the signer’s
identity.
Helbach et al. [74] have presented an extension to code voting approach in
order to resist vote selling attack by combining vote update feature and linkable
group signature. Note that code voting consists on using a separate channel from
the voting authority to the voter, e.g., using snail mail. To mitigate against vote
selling attack, a voter is allowed to update his vote as many time as he wants
while the last vote is counted. This makes the vote buyer never sure that the
voter will not update his vote, after he has proven his choice to the vote buyer.
The use of LGS enables to link different votes issued by the same voter in order
to update his vote.
Yan et al. [72] have designed an e-cash system based on a certificate-less
group signature. The proposed GS signature achieves unforgeability, money
tampering and money double-spending requirements. The proposed e-cash so-
lution supports Fair Off-Line Multi-Bank System that allows the interaction of
multiple banks in off-line mode.
Malina et al. [69] have proposed a combination of a group signature scheme
and the probabilistic ElGamal encryption scheme to preserve the anonymity of
voters during the voting and tallying processes. To achieve the accountability
feature, this solution relies on the cooperation of a manager and the election
authority to reveal a user identity and revoke her from the voting system.
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4.2.4. Sanitizable Signatures
Sanitizable signatures are malleable signatures, introduced in 2005, by Ate-
niese et al. [76]. Sanitizable signatures, denoted by StS, enable a designated
party, referred to as a sanitizer, to modify some parts of the original message,
in a controlled way initially defined by the original signer, while resulting in a
still valid signature, as depicted in Figure 6.
Definitions. To enable the authorized sanitizer to modify parts of the original
message m, the signer provides a description of the admissible modifications
Adm for each message-sanitizer pairs. That is, the signer divides the message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ into N blocks m1, · · · ,mN , defines the set Sadm ⊆ {1, N} of ad-
missible blocks and signs the whole message using a key related to the sanitizer.
Using this key, the sanitizer is next able to modify the admissible parts of the
given message so that the resulting signature is still valid under the signer public
key.
Fundamentally, two additional functions Adm and Mod are considered to
define the admissible modifications, such as:
• Adm maps each messagem to the admissible blocks. It outputs the rank of
every admissible block and the corresponding the length li of the related
ith block, such that l =
∑N
i=1 li is the length of the message m. The
Sadm ⊆ {1, N} represents the set of the ranks of admissible blocks.
We note that there exists an optional function, called Fix. It maps a
message m to its fixed parts. The Fix function outputs the set of fixed
blocks, called Sfix ⊆ {1, N}. That is, Sfix is the concatenation of all
blocks not appearing in Sadm.
• Mod maps a message mj to the modified message m′j , where j is the rank
of the block mj . It is defined as a set of pairs (j,m
′
j), such that the block
mj has to be replaced by m
′
j .
A sanitizable signature scheme has to ensure the correctness property. It
states that honestly generated (signing correctness) and sanitized (sanitizing
correctness) signatures have to be accepted by the verifier, and that honestly
generated proofs on valid signatures (proof correctness) have to be accepted by
the verifying entity.
Several features have been proposed to StS. Indeed, in 2010, Canard and Jam-
bert integrated some extensions to sanitizable signature schemes [77]. They
showed how to limit the set of possible modifications on one single block and
how to enforce the same modifications on different messages blocks. Then, Ca-
nard et al. extended sanitizable signatures to the setting of multiple signers and
sanitizers [78].
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Figure 6: Sanitizable Signature Flow Diagram
From Sanitizable Signatures to Anonymous Credential Systems. As stated above,
StS schemes are considered as powerful malleable primitives that allow compu-
tations on authenticated data. Thus, this class of signatures is widely adopted
in the design of several AC systems [54, 79].
In [80], Chow et al. proposed a privacy-preserving distributed identity man-
agement mechanism for cloud environments. The proposed mechanism combines
both group signatures and sanitizable signatures to authenticate to different
cloud providers. The main purpose of using StS is to hide some parts of the
messages which are not the concerns of a particular cloud service provider.
Later, in [81], Canard and Lescuyer formalized the usage of StS for anonymous
credential systems, while providing a concrete construction based on standard
assumptions. They extended sanitizable signatures’ features as follows:
• verifying without sanitizing key — the signature should be verified without
the sanitizer’s public key, in order to ensure user’s anonymity.
• traceability of signatures — this algorithm should be performed by a sepa-
rate authority in order to recover the actual designated sanitizer of a given
message-signature pair.
• no proof algorithm — there is no need for a proof algorithm, in the sense
that the above tracing procedure is not designed to decide whether a given
signature has been sanitized or not.
• restrictions on admissible values — modifications are carried out in a
controlled way.
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• replaying sessions — the sanitizer has to modify the admissible parts of the
message with respect to a random value sent by the verifier in each session.
Recently, in 2018, Pamies-Estremes et al. proposed a new security mecha-
nism that addresses the issue of protecting the identity of end-users and their
sensitive personal data generated by Internet-based personal devices like Google
Home28 and Amazon Echo29 [82]. The proposed scheme combines the use of
anonymization techniques, introduced in subsection 5.1 and sanitizable signa-
tures. The signing process permits to hide authenticated identifying information
while transferring data stream from the local device to remote storage servers.
4.2.5. Blind Signatures
Blind signatures allow a user to obtain a signature from a signer where this
latter can not learn information about the message she signed and the user can
get only one valid signature after one interaction with the signer [49, 71]. In the
following, we denote by BS, a blind signature scheme.
Definitions. A BS scheme is a form of a digital signature that enables the re-
ceiver to get a message signed by the signer without revealing any information
about the message. As depicted in Figure 7, in the blind version of the Schnorr
signature scheme [83], the signer proves knowledge of his secret x based on his
public key h = gx. Then, the receiver creates a challenge, such that the result-
ing signature is computed based on the commitment and the response of the
signer. The resulting signature (c′, r′) is verified by checking if c′ is equal to
H(m||gr′h−c′). The verifier entity can forward her message and signature to a
third party which will be able to verify the signature as being generated by a
legitimate signer.
Blind Signatures Applications to Anonymous Authentication. BS schemes can
conveniently be used to issue randomized presentation tokens, as required by
AC system. That is, the validity of the signature, i.e., correctness of verification,
ensures that the user generating the token is allowed to access a service. The
blindness of the signature ensures that the service provider is not able to either
recognize the actual signing user nor detecting a previously issued token so as
associate it with a particular user.
BS schemes have been applied in several use-cases and different settings.
Indeed, a variant of blind signatures is a main building block for AC systems,
i.e., Brands’ signature [84] that was used to build the U-Prove system. That
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Figure 7: Schnorr Blind Signature Protocol
issuer blindly signs a commitment. The attributes are assumed to be common
input to the user and the issuer, the resulting credential and the corresponding
secret key are only known to the user. Thus, even in case of a collusion between
an issuer and a verifier, it is impossible to relate a credential to a particular
user.
In [85], Verheul proposed a new privacy preserving scheme, known as self-
blindable credentials, that is based on Chaum-Pederson signature [86]. The idea
behind the self-blindable credentials is that every time a credential is used it is
blinded such that two occurrences of the same credential cannot be recognised.
This is different than the U-Prove token which is the same in each transaction,
and hence serves as a pseudonym. The benefit of this approach is that the use
of such credentials is untraceable.
4.2.6. Comparative Industrial Solutions
As stated above, two main industrial solutions emerged, namely Idemix30
[87] and U-Prove31 [88]. An Idemix credential is a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL)
signature, a variant of group signatures, generated by the issuer over the user’s
secret key and the attribute values [50]. To transform a credential into a pre-
sentation token, the user creates a zero-knowledge proof showing that he knows
a valid CL signature on a committed value. Interested readers may refer to [89]
for more details about cryptographic primitives, namely zero-knowledge proofs
and commitments schemes.
On the other side, U-Prove is based on Brands signature which is a variant of
blind signatures [84].
Table 3 presents an informal comparison between Idemix and U-Prove, based




Table 3: Comparison between Industrial Solutions Idemix and U-Prove
Attribute based Credential Schemes Idemix U-Prove
anonymity X X
unlinkability issue-show unlinkability X X
Properties multi-show unlinkability X ×
revocation X X
inspection X X
selective disclosure X X
issuing a credential (5 attributes) 2.6 5.5
Performances (in sec)* selective disclosure empty proof 1.5 0.9
a proof hiding two attributes among the five < 1 0.6
* Implementation results are based on a MULTOS smart-card platform [90, 91].
and U-Prove preserve the anonymity of users during the authentication process,
thanks to the use of CL and Brands signatures respectively, and zero-knowledge
proofs [92, 89]. Additionally, these two anonymous credentials’ systems inherit
the unforgeability property from their related signature schemes, such that, an
entity that does not belong to the set of authorized users cannot successfully
run the authentication protocol with the service provider.
Furthermore, both credentials can be abstractly seen as signed commitments
[89]. A commitment in this case is basically the product of (algebraic) group
generators with attributes and a secret key as their exponents. As a result of
this resemblance, selective disclosure can be done similarly. Having received
some attributes, the verifier can reproduce a partial product from the commit-
ment. Then, he can combine it with the presented proof of knowledge about all
the other attributes. Only a user having a valid credential can provide such a
proof.
However, unlike Idemix, U-Prove does not support multi-show unlinkability.
This means that the U-Prove credential is revealed every time it is used, and
as such, for better privacy support, it requires the issuer to generate as many
different U-Prove credentials as their verification instances. This is due to the
U-Prove issuance protocol relying on un-randomisable signatures. For Idemix
provided with randomisable signatures, the user can randomize by himself the
same Idemix credential as many times as needed, for presentation to the verifier,
thus naturally ensuring multi-show unlinkability.
As explained in [90, 91], the implementation on a MULTOS smart-card
platform of both U-Prove and Idemix solutions for five attributes shows that the
issuance of U-Prove credentials is much more resource consuming than Idemix.
Indeed, a the issuance procedure of a credential containing 5 attributes takes
only 2.6 sec, using the Idemix issuance algorithm, compared to 5.5 sec, for
U-Prove. This is mainly due the number of interactions during the issuance
process, resulting on heavy communication overhead. On the other side, the
presentation procedure of Idemix is much more resource-consuming compared
to U-Prove. That is, the presentation of an empty proof takes around 1.5 sec,
using the Idemix issuance algorithm, compared to only 0.9 sec. This is mainly
due to the heavy computation overhead of CL signatures, performed in large
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RSA groups.
4.2.7. Comparison between Privacy Preserving Certification Schemes based on
Several Signatures Schemes
Table 4 gives a quantitative comparison between the reviewed signature
schemes’ properties w.r.t. security and functional security and functional fea-
tures expected from anonymous certification schemes. First, we have to empha-
size that all reviewed signature schemes, i.e., ABS, StS, GS and BS schemes,
are considered as cryptographic primitives while AC refers to a complete system,
involving several procedures and algorithms. Consequently, while all signatures’
schemes ensure the unforgeability and anonymity/privacy properties, it is fair
and justifiable that these signatures do not support all AC’s expected security
and functional features.
Table 4: Comparative Signature Schemes Analysis to Fulfil the Security and Functional Re-
quirements of Anonymous Credential Systems
ACS Expected Properties Sanitizable Signatures Attribute Based Signatures Group Signatures Blind Signatures
Security Properties
Unforgeability unforgeability unforgeability unforgeability unforgeability
immutability *
Anonymity privacy perfect privacy [62] anonymity privacy (blindness)
verifying without sanitizing key [81] public verifiability public verifiability
Multi-show unlinkability unlinkability unlinkability unlinkability unlinkability
Functional Properties
Selective Disclosure sanitizing feature predicate-based signing feature
Traceability (inspection procedure) traceability [81] accountability [62] accountability (open feature) traceability
* It is not possible for the sanitizer to modify non admissible blocks of a signed
message. That is, no modification is allowed on fixed parts or on an admissible
part with disallowed values.
Then, as detailed above, all reviewed signatures’ schemes have been extended
and several algorithms were adapted and/or added to support AC’s security
properties.
Indeed, constructions [81] and [63], introducing two different AC systems
based on StS and ABS respectively, adapted these primitives and provided a
new feature, i.e., the traceability. For instance, [81] proposed to design a new
algorithm that is performed by a separate authority, i.e., the inspector, in order
to recover the sanitizer of a given message-signature pair. Another extension
toward the support of multiple signers, i.e., issuers for an AC system, is equally
proposed [78]. Additionally, the sanitizing algorithm is adapted to limit modifi-
cations on admissible values/blocks, in order to ensure that these modifications
are executed in a controlled way. Similarly, [63] introduced a new algorithm that
is performed by a dedicated trusted entity, i.e., the inspector, responsible for
removing the anonymity of the user originating an ABS signature. In addition,
[63] proposed an interesting extension to the credentials’ issuance algorithm that
supports the issuance of credentials from different issuers, associated to one user
through its public key.
From Table 4, it is noticeable that contrary to i.e., ABS, StS and GS, BS
schemes do not support the multi-show unlinkability property, as explained in
section 4.2.6, due to their intrinsic properties.
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Another main difference between reviewed signatures’ schemes consists in
computation and communication overheads, induced from the execution of the
different algorithms. Indeed, the bandwidth consumption is measured through
the exchanged quantity of data during protocols’ execution w.r.t. the number
of attributes supported by a credential or a presentation token. On the other
hand, the computation cost at the user, issuer and verifier sides is measured
w.r.t. the number and complexity of performed operations during protocols’
running. Thus, performances’ criterion is very important while selecting the
appropriate signature scheme. Nevertheless, ABS, StS, GS and BS schemes are
direct signatures, thus, their issuance algorithm’s overhead is rather interesting,
compared to complete industrial solutions, i.e., Idemix [87] and U-Prove [88]
solutions.
4.3. Obfuscation: Data Perturbation
Obfuscation techniques aim at intentionally making information difficult to
understand or perceive for security and privacy reasons. In fact, the speed of
dissemination of information, the technical progress and the global nature of
Internet make it difficult to delete data that may be too personal, embarrassing
or confidential. Thus, obfuscation consists mainly in publishing large amounts
of information that are false, imprecise, irrelevant and/or organized in such a
way that the information that one wishes to protect is hidden, i.e., embedded
in a large volume of data.
Obfuscation mechanisms may be deployed at both the user and server sides.
Indeed, data perturbation, considered as user-side technique is detailed here-
after, while private information retrieval, considered as a server-involving tech-
nique, is introduced in subsection 5.3.
From an end-user point of view, an alternative to hinder an attacker in
its efforts to precisely profile users consists in perturbing the information they
explicitly or implicitly disclose when communicating with a personalized infor-
mation system. The submission of false data, together with the user genuine
data, is an illustrative example of data-perturbation mechanism. In this kind of
mechanisms, the perturbation itself typically takes place at the user side. This
means that users do not need to trust any external entity.
Data perturbation techniques are used for enhancing privacy in location based
services. Indeed, to protect queries, Pingley et al. introduced Dummy-Q [93].
They proposed to generate dummy queries that will be sent to the LBS server
along with the real query. That is, based on a query-perturbation mechanism,
Dummy-Q requires the installation of a software at the client-side in order to
produce a series of fake queries with different query attributes, except the same
location as the real one. As such, the LBS server cannot determine in which
attributes the user has interest. Niu et al. proposed a dummy location selection
(DLS) algorithm, that permits to hide the real location of users [94]. Contrary
to the traditional dummy location schemes, [94] considers that an adversary
may have side information about the real position of the user. Thus, the pro-
posed algorithm consists in an entropy-based measure to achieve K-anonymity.
Data perturbation is also used to ensure private web browsing. For instance,
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in 2006, Elovici et al. presented a privacy-preserving web search system, called
PRAW [95]. It ensures the privacy of a group of users that share the same ac-
cess point to the Web. That is, the authors propose to hide the real user profile
by generating fake transactions, for instance, accesses to a fake web page, etc.
Similarly, in [96], Ye et al. proposed a private web browsing solution. Based
on the PRAW scheme, the authors propose to send a real query with a certain
probability and a dummy one with the complement of that probability. As such,
it is not feasible for an attacker to figure out the real query. Recently, Masood
et al. introduced Incognito, a privacy-aware obfuscation method for Web data
[97]. The main idea behind this solution is to first rely on probabilistic meth-
ods to measure the privacy risk of generated Web data. Then, data with high
predicted risk are obfuscated to minimize the privacy risk using semantically
similar data.
Data perturbation of user profiles for privacy preservation purposes may be
achieved not only through the injection of false/dummy information, but also
via suppression. For instance, in [98], Parra et al. propose to eliminate tags
from queries, in order to enhance privacy in semantic web scenarios. However,
this solution comes at the expense of the semantic functions of the web. Sub-
sequently, the authors investigate, in [99], the privacy utility trade-offs induced
by the suppression technique.
A combined usage of both methods, namely the addition and suppression, is
discussed for personalized recommendation systems [100]. Thus, the main idea is
to analytically study the impact of the adoption of both methods. That is, users
may submit false ratings that do not reflect their preferences, and/or refrain
from ratings other items. Later, in 2017, Polatidis et al. presented a privacy-
preserving collaborative recommendation scheme, through the perturbation of
each rating [101]. The proposed approach relies on multiple levels and different
ranges of random values for each level. Before transferring each rate to the
remote server, the privacy level and the perturbation range have to be selected
randomly from a fixed range of privacy levels.
4.4. Privacy preserving Computation: Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)
Privacy preserving computation techniques aim at protecting users’ privacy
and the secrecy of data contents during processing over these data. These tech-
niques involve several powerful cryptographic primitives that may be deployed
at the user side as Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) or at the server side
as Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes presented in subsection 5.4.
4.4.1. Definitions
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) are considered under the untrusted
model [102]. Indeed, the goal of SMC techniques is to enable distributed com-
puting tasks among participating entities in a secure manner. That is, SMC
considers that a group of participants wants to carry a joint computation of
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Figure 8: Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) Flow Diagram: Addition Scenario
a given function while keeping secret the input data of each party. SMC has
been used to solve several privacy-preserving problems such as private database
queries, secret voting, privacy preserving data mining and privacy preserving
intrusion detection tools and mechanisms [103, 104, 105, 106, 107].
SMC was first introduced and formalized in 1982 by Yao, relying on the mil-
lionaire problem [108]. The Yao’s problem considers two entities that want to
determine who is the richest, but without revealing their actual wealth. Indeed,
a set of participants have to compute the value of a function f (i.e., f represents
the max function) using their private inputs, without revealing anything about
them. Hence, they run an interactive protocol in between. Several SMC mech-
anisms rely on a circuit evaluation protocol [109]. In fact, each party’s input
value is represented by a boolean circuit, or an arithmetic circuit, while com-
munication exchanges between circuit gates are based on the Oblivious Transfer
protocol using randomly selected variables [110].
Figure 8 depicts an illustrative example of an SMC algorithm executed be-
tween three end-users, where f represents the addition function. Let us assume
that each user Ui, where i ∈ {A,B,C}, has a secret Xj , such that j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The group of users performs an interactive SMC algorithm to compute the sum
of their private inputs, denoted by S. For this purpose, each user Ui first di-
vides his secret Xj into three different pieces Xj,i. Then, it sends one share
to each corresponding peer and keeps secret one share locally, as shown in Fig-
ure 8. Upon receiving the different shares from all peers, each user computes
Si =
∑3
j=1Xj,i and sends the result to his peers. Finally, each user is able to
calculate the sum of different shares, such as S =
∑C
i=A Si.
Although SMC mechanisms ensure privacy-preserving features, they still suf-
fer from a heavy processing and high communication cost, mainly burdensome
for resource-constrained devices. Generally, the security of SMC schemes is de-
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fined with respect to the ideal model, where f is executed by a trusted party.
That is, it is required that during the execution of a protocol, parties cannot
learn more information about the inputs of the other entities than they would
learn if f was computed by the trusted parties. SMC schemes have to fulfill the
following additional properties:
• correctness — a malicious party, or a set of malicious entities, should
not be able to influence the output of the honest parties more than they
could in the ideal model by modifying their own inputs.
• inputs’ independence — considering that in the ideal model, all inputs
are sent to the trusted party before any output is received. Thus, malicious
parties do not know anything about the inputs of honest parties when
they send their entries. Roughly speaking, each party’s entry is chosen
independently from others.
• fairness — this property ensures that honest parties have always access
to the correct output, even if a minority of parties is malicious. However,
the lack of fairness is unavoidable, when malicious entities can terminate
the protocol after learning the output, thus preventing honest entities
from learning it. Several works proposed to overcome this impossibility
by relaxing the security requirements.
Three different approaches are generally deployed to provide secure multi-
party computation functionalities, namely oblivious transfer [110], homomor-
phic encryption [111] and secret sharing [112, 103] techniques.
The oblivious transfer protocol generates high processing and communication
overheads. The secret sharing approach gives better results in terms of computa-
tion cost, thanks to the usage of primitive operations [113]. However, it requires
the existence of secure channels between different participating entities, hence
generating a high bandwidth consumption, due to the involved interactions be-
tween users. The homomorphic encryption does not require the existence of
secure channels and assures high level of privacy. However, it necessitates sev-
eral processing operations to ensure homomorphism properties, thus generating
high computation complexity.
4.4.2. SMC Applications
Several works have been proposed in order to ensure privacy preserving col-
laborative computations for pervasive applications [104, 114, 105, 106, 115? ].
In [104], Reiter et al. introduced a novel user collaboration protocol, called
Crowds. The proposed protocol enables a group of users to collaborate in order
to submit their queries/messages to an untrusted web server. That is, before
sending a message, the user flips a coin to decide whether to submit it directly
to the service provider, or to send it to another peer, who will then repeat the
randomized decision. Note that each user belongs to a pre-defined group of
users, that collaborate together to preserve their mutual privacy. The main in-
convenience of Crowds consists on the heavy communication overhead, mainly
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due to additional hops.
Following Crowds protocol, Barba et al. proposed a privacy preserving scheme
to report traffic violations in vehicular applications [116]. Rather, their construc-
tion introduced acceptable computation and communication costs compared to
Crowds. In 2009, Pathak et al. proposed a scalable protocol to perform secure
multi-party computations on encrypted data for banking applications [105]. In
their scheme, modifier tokens are generated along with the encryption process.
Thus, the enciphering algorithm is based on the acquired data and modifier
tokens to compute the ciphertext without revealing the output data. Therefore,
users’ privacy is preserved. Jaydip Sen discusses research directions of SMC us-
age for IoT applications [117] and states that most of the proposed constructions
are domain-specific and are not suitable in ubiquitous environments. As stated
above, these schemes produce important computation and communication over-
heads for resource-constrained devices, due the usage of oblivious transfer, ho-
momorphic encryption as well as secret sharing techniques. Recently, in 2017,
Tonyali et al. [115] presented a privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme
adapted to IoT applications. That is, each participating device uses a pseudo-
random number generator to locally compute the shares that are calculated by
the other nodes. Hence, they do not need to exchange the shares before each
data collection round.
For personalized web-search services, Erola et al. propose a new privacy
preserving web-search scheme, following the same philosophy introduced by
Crowds, while grouping users with respect to their interests [118]. In the same
vein, Rebollo et al. presented a new scheme for privacy preserving web search
applications [119]. In their proposal, two users or more exchange a portion of
their queries before submitting to the web-search engine, in order to hide their
interests, w.r.t. the service provider.
5. Server Side Techniques
Server-side privacy preserving techniques include mechanisms where service
providers are required to perform additional processing on their clients’ hosted
data. That is, service providers may be involved in anonymizing their databases,
for further use by third parties, removing identifying traces or executing heavy
computations on encrypted data contents at the request of their clients.
Server-side techniques include Statistical Disclosure Control mechanisms de-
tailed in subsection 5.1, self-destructing systems presented in subsection 5.2,
Private Information Retrieval techniques introduced in subsection 5.3 and ho-
momorphic encryption schemes as discussed in subsection 5.4.
5.1. Statistical Disclosure Control
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) mechanisms are mainly used to protect
data within statistical databases. They permit to resolve the trade-off between
data usability and users’ privacy preservation, as revealed results, either the
35
databases or a specific result over the databasis do not permit to reveal infor-
mation related to a specific user.
SDC techniques include database anonymizing techniques and Differential Pri-
vacy mechanisms. Anonymization techniques are relevant for various use-cases,
namely applications that do not require to learn the original user’s identity, but
only context information. Anonymization techniques mainly refer to database
privacy preservation. That is, for statistical purposes, database privacy refers
to the privacy of respondents to which the database records correspond. Even
so, for cooperative applications where the database belongs to several corpora-
tions, it comes to the privacy protection of the various collaborating entities,
i.e., data owner privacy. For several pervasive applications, for instance health
care systems, both respondent and data owner’s privacy is required: the patient
wants to ensure his privacy preservation and the medical records have to be
protected. Finally, for personalized web search engines, the growing concern is
about users’ privacy.
In the following, we first review techniques derived from database anonymity
(subsection 5.1.1). Then, we detail anonymization techniques for data mining
processes, and mainly Differential Privacy (subsection 5.1.2).
5.1.1. Anonymizing databases
Main techniques for anonymizing databases w.r.t. respondent, owner and
users’ privacy include k-anonymity, t-closeness and l-diversity [120]. Note that
these techniques that are originally used over statistical databases have extended
usage to dynamic data, as presented below.
K-anonymity. In 2001, Samarati introduced the notion of k-anonymity, to pre-
vent the conflict between information loss and disclosure risk.
For defining the k-anonymity approach, we first distinguish three types of at-
tributes [121], for a microdata set S:
• identifiers: attributes that exactly identify the respondent, such as, his
social security number or tax number. Generally, it is assumed that during
a pre-processing step, identifiers in S have to be removed or encrypted.
• key attributes: attributes of S that are useful to the application and which
combination with external information can serve to re-identify respondents
of the database. Examples of these attributes are : gender, age, ZIP code,
· · · Unlike identifiers, these attributes cannot be removed from S.
• confidential outcome attributes or sensitive attributes: Attributes which
values are of high interest for the adversary. They usually include religion,
salaries, etc.
Intuitively, to enforce anonymity, it is necessary to identify which attributes
are considered as key attributes, called also quasi-identifiers [122]. That is to
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say, k-anonymity is able to prevent identity disclosure, i.e., a record in the k-
anonymized set Sk cannot be mapped back to the corresponding record in the
original S, hence, by ensuring that each record is indistinguishable by at least
other k− 1 records based on the value of key attributes. However, k-anonymity
is not resistant to attribute disclosure attacks, as illustrated by the following
example: Let us suppose that a patient’s health record is k-anonymized into
a group of k-patients, while considering three different key attributes, namely
Age = 42, Height = 160 and Weight = 75. Thus, if all patients share the same
confidential attribute Disease = Cancer, k-anonymization may be useless as an
attacker may link an external record with the above group of patients, based
on the key attributes. Thus, the attacker can successfully perform an attribute
disclosure attack by inferring that Mariana Ju suffers from Cancer.
K-anonymity techniques originally designed for statistical database have
been applied to more dynamic context-aware systems [123, 124, 125, 126]. In-
deed, for Location-Based Services (LBS), an attacker, having access to users’
location, may be able to identify the requesting user, relying on its spatio-
temporal parameters. Consequently, several research works propose to expand
the precise location of the user to involve several potential requesting issuers.
This leads to generalizing several context-data to ensure anonymity, thus result-
ing in the context information released to the service provider being sometimes
too large and imprecise to provide an acceptable quality for the service. To
alleviate the trade-off between privacy and personalization, Shin et al. propose
several personalized anonymization profiles, based on different desired levels of
privacy [127]. For instance, a user may choose to generalize the area with 1
km2, without requiring generalization in his profile data.
Several services, such as well-being applications, or recommendation services
do not generally rely on users’ location, but other context-data, such as users’
activities, users’ habits and interests, etc. In [128], Riboni et al. pointed out
that even when k-anonymity is enforced, an attacker may identify an actual
requesting user, while monitoring the behaviour of the set of potential request-
ing entities w.r.t. services’ responses. [128] proposes to deploy an intermediary
trusted entity that is responsible for computing the level of privacy violation
(based on some privacy metrics), associated with possible responses suggested
by the service, thus the user is notified before authenticating with the service
provider.
l-diversity. In 2006, Machanavajjla et al. introduced the notion of l-diversity
as an improved version of k-anonymity [129] resistant to attribute disclosure
attacks. Definition 5.1 defines l-diversity as follows:
Definition 5.1. l-diversity [121] A data set is said to satisfy l-diversity if,
for each group of records that shares the same combination of key attributes
(i.e., equivalence class), there exist at least l well represented values for each
confidential attribute.
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Well represented means that key attributes should have at least l-distinct
values or their entropy is greater than log l.
Note that l-diversity approaches offer better resistance to attribute disclosures
than k-anonymity, but still remain vulnerable [130] in case values of a sensitive
attribute within a group are l-diverse, but semantically similar. Indeed, let us
consider that some patients records are available in a 3-diverse data set where
the confidential attribute Disease belongs to the set { breast cancer, liver cancer,
bladder cancer }. The adversary knowing that a specific user is part of that
group, can infer that the user has cancer. If the sensitive attribute is numerical
and values within a group are l-diverse but very similar, the attacker can then
estimate the sensitive attribute value.
The l-diversity technique has been used in several privacy-preserving location-
based approach [131, 132, 133, 134, 135]. In [131], Liu et al. defined the query
l-diversity concept for location-based services. In fact, the main idea consists in
ensuring that queries’ contents have to be different enough for all queries that
share the same cloaked area. As such, it is impossible to link a query with its
original issuer, with a probability less than a pre-defined threshold value. Later,
in [132], Bamba et al presented a privacy preserving location-based framework
for mobile applications, called PrivacyGrid. The proposed framework pro-
vides a location privacy preference profile model, which allows mobile users to
explicitly define their preferred location privacy requirements in terms of both
location hiding measures (i.e., location k-anonymity and location l-diversity)
and location QoS measures. Concretely, each mobile user communicates with a
number of LBS servers, via a proxy anonymizing-location server. Indeed, each
proxy server tracks the location updates of the mobile users and performs lo-
cation anonymization based on publicly available data which can be used for
ensuring location l-diversity for user requests. In 2009, Xue et al. formally
defined the location diversity concept [133]. They assume that this concept im-
proves the spatial k-anonymity by ensuring that each query can be associated
with at least l different semantic locations (e.g., parking, university, drug-store,
etc.). Consequently, the authors presented a new algorithm that permits to
construct a group of l-different semantic locations.
Wang et al. introduced a new scheme to protect queries’ attributes [134].
The proposed construction permits to generate a cloaking area for continuous
LBSs and the anonymizing server refines the results w.r.t. l-diversity and k-
anonymity processes. In 2017, Ye et al. introduced a new l-diversity algorithm
that relies on road networks in order to enhance trajectory secrecy [135]. The
proposed algorithm pre-processes a set of similar trajectories to hide the actual
real trajectory of a user. In addition, to de-personalize the user’s trajectory,
each location reported to LBS server is a cloaking region that contains at least
other l-1 different trajectories, which are generated in advance from road maps.
t-closeness. In 2007, Li et al. introduced t-closeness to mitigate attacks against
k-anonymity and l-diversity approaches [130]. It is defined as follows:
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Definition 5.2. t-closeness [130] A data set is said to ensure the t-closeness
property, if for each group of records that shares a combination of key attributes
(i.e., equivalence class), the distance between the distribution of a sensitive
attribute in this class and the distribution of the attribute in the original table
is no more than a threshold t.
While improving resistance to known attacks, t-closeness is known to damage
the data utility due to some noise introduction through data perturbation and
generalization techniques. Moreover, as identified in [136], even for the same
level of t-closeness privacy referred to as ”t”, the effective achieved privacy mea-
surement is actually more relying on the classification of attribute values, which
is very much subjective, than the ”t” value.
To ensure queries privacy, t-closeness algorithms are generally combined
with k-anonymity techniques. For instance, in [137], Riboni et al. proposed
an anonymisation technique for location based queries, relying on the general-
ization of spatio-temporal information. That is, the authors noticed that both
several concurrent requests may occur and similar requests issued by the same
users may be repeated. Thus, to encounter such kind of privacy attacks, the
proposed framework is based on the association of k-anonymity and t-closeness
techniques.
5.1.2. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is gaining an expanding interest, mainly to ensure
privacy preserving data mining [138, 139, 140, 141]. In a nutshell, differential
privacy ensures that the removal or addition of a single database item does not
(substantially) affect the outcome of any analysis (i.e., the probability distribu-
tion of released items does not significantly change), as presented in Definition
5.3. This property is enforced by adding random noise, to the exact outcome.
Moreover, note that differential privacy addresses data leakage attacks as even
if a user has removed his data from the data set, no outputs would become
significantly more or less likely.
Definition 5.3. Differential Privacy [138] A randomized function F ensures
ε-differential privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one
element, and all S ⊆ Range(F),
Pr[F(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)× Pr[F(D2) ∈ S]
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of F .
Dwork et al. [138] discussed Definition 5.3 as follows:
• The public parameter ε is not fixed and is defined at the convenience of the
anonymizer, depending on processing contexts. That is, if the probability
that an event is very small, it might be tolerable to increase ε by 2 or 3,
while if the probability is considered to be close to unacceptable, then an
increase by a factor of e0.001 might be tolerable.
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• Definition 5.3 is independent of any auxiliary knowledge the adversary, or
user, may have about the database.
• Definition 5.3 extends to group privacy as well (and to the case in which
a user contributes more than a single row to the database). A collection
of several users might be concerned that their shared data might leak
information, even when a single user does not.
When DP techniques are applied at the data owner side, without the need for
a third party, it is called Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [142]. The main idea
behind LDP is to allow users to locally perturb their input data. LDP algorithms
have been applied in several contexts, and three main practical realizations are
introduced, namely:
• Google’s RAPPOR solution — it permits to identify popular visited web-
sites (URLs) without revealing any individual user’s browsing habits and
interests. That is, RAPPOR combines Randomized Response with Bloom
Filters to compactly encode massive sets [143].
• Apple’s DP technique — it combines a set of algorithms and functions to
ensure a perfect differentially private large data-sets. For instance, it relies
on the Fourier transform to spread out signal information, and sketching
techniques to reduce the dimensionality of the massive domain. This tech-
nique was introduced in 2016, at the keynote address of Apple’s World-
wide Developers’ Conference32, where the company’s senior vice president
of software engineering Craig Federighi emphasized that Apple does not
assemble user profiles. Afterwards, a patent of Apple’s DP technique was
filed [144].
• Microsoft’s Telemetry collection — it applies an efficient LDP algorithm
adapted to repeated collection of counter data, such as daily applications’
usage statistics. This solution relies on fixed random numbers to collect
data over time [145].
In the literature, DP has also been investigated and applied to several use-
cases. In [146], Riboni et al. propose a differentially private mechanism to
release check-in data to an untrusted recommender. They assume that there
is a trusted check-in collector responsible for applying the differential privacy
technique before releasing data to the untrusted recommender. This proposal
permits to counteract both the recommender and malicious users, that attempt
to send fake queries in order to construct locations visited by a target user.
In the same vein, Chen et al. consider the problem of publishing useful network
structures while preventing an attacker from learning the existence of any single
edge, even when the underlying edges are correlated, thanks to the differential
privacy technique applied over data streams [147].
32https://www.wired.com/2016/06/apples-differential-privacy-collecting-data/
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In 2017, To et al. proposed a framework for protecting privacy of worker lo-
cations, whereby the Spatial Crowdsourcing-server (SC-server) only has access
to data sanitized according to differential privacy [148]. Workers subscribe to
a cellular service provider (CSP) that provides Internet connectivity. The CSP
already has access to the worker locations (e.g., through cell tower triangula-
tion), but as opposed to the SC-server, the CSP signs a contract with its clients,
stipulating the terms and conditions of location disclosure. The CSP collects
user locations and releases them to SC-servers in a noisy form, according to
DP. Recently, Asghar et al. presented an application of a differentially private
algorithm to release public transport usage [149]. Advantages are multifold.
Data can serve to design new value-added services. Users privacy is preserved
by avoiding that valuable information about transport usage is extracted from
the user’s transport card with high privacy disclosure risks like users tracking
over one trip or a series of trips.
5.2. Self-Destructing Data Systems
Earlier this year, Kromtech33 security researchers have discovered that the
logistics company, FedEx has stored a huge amount of customers’ sensitive data
such as scanned documents including passports, driving licenses and security
IDs as well as home addresses, postal codes and phone numbers, in a publicly
available Amazon S3 bucket. This research has revealed that these data have
been collected between 2009 and 2012 which means that customers data have
been online for years.
One solution to mitigate this kind of private data breaches is to apply self-
destructing data systems. These systems are mainly designed to ensure data
deletion from storage services and services after a pre-defined timeout.
More generally, self-destructing data can be widely applied to web applica-
tions where user’s sensitive data can persist in cloud servers indefinitely. The
application of self-destructing data mechanisms allows users to regain control
over their data such as Facebook private messages, Google docs, private photos
on Instagram, etc.
Vanish [150] is a self-destructing data solution based on a combination of
cryptographic techniques, P2P infrastructures and Distributed Hash Tables
(DHTs). Vanish encrypts users’ data locally using a randomly generated se-
cret key. Vanish generates secret shares from the key then destroys the local
copy of the secret key while storing the generated secret shares across random
nodes in the DHT. This latter discards the key shares after a certain time,
therefore, keys are lost forever and data are permanently unreadable. On top of
Vanish, a Firefox plugin is built for Gmail to self-delete emails while a browser
extension is provided to integrate destroyable elements on a website. However,
this mechanism suffers from Sybil attacks [151] which consist in compromising
the system by collecting secret shares from DHT before reaching their time-out.
33https://kromtech.com/blog/security-center
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To improve Vanish resistance toward Sybil attacks, several versions of Vanish
(Vanish 0.1 and Vanish 0.2) have been introduced [152].
Ephemerizer [153] is a cryptographic protocol proposed by Perlam [153] to
ensure the deletion of data after an expiration time. It is based on the use of
an ephemerizer which is an entity responsible for generating a set of ephemeral
keys while deleting the expired ones. Data are encrypted using these ephemeral
keys which makes them non-accessible after the expiration time.
Neuralyzer [154] introduces a data deletion scheme based on the flexible ex-
piration time concept. Instead of being based on a pre-defined expiration time,
setting a suitable time for data deletion can be based on a suitable revocation
model. For example, after interest in data has been dropped or even after de-
tecting an excessive access to these data. Neuralyzer uses the cache mechanisms
of the Domain Name System (DNS). It enciphers data and then splits the de-
cryption key into parts and stores them on different DNS entries. The key is
recoverable by all the parties who know which DNS entries are storing the key
parts. Obviously, data access automatically extends the lifetime of the key in
the DNS entries because the cache is not deleted. However, once the cache is
not accessed, it is deleted which implies the destruction of the decryption keys
stored in.
5.3. Obfuscation: Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
As introduced in subsection 4.3, obfuscation refers to hiding the intended
meaning of a communication process, by making queries and/or responses dif-
ficult to understand. This category is mainly considered under a semi-trusted
threat model, and it involves the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) as a server-
side technique.
5.3.1. Definitions
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) enables users to request data items from
a remote database server with no need to reveal which item is retrieved [155,
6, 156, 157]. A trivial solution to that problem is for the user to request the
entire database, thus ensuring perfect privacy for the requesting entity, but at
the price of high communication overhead. Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
schemes are efficient solutions adapted for large databases. They support good
privacy level with regard to curious servers’ threat models, and as a consequence
they are not compatible with personalization of services [6].
Generally, PIR algorithms are interactive schemes between a client and a re-
mote database server, usually classified w.r.t. the privacy guarantees as follows:
• Computational PIR (cPIR) – provides privacy against computation-
ally bounded servers. That is, the privacy of the cloud client depends on
the computational intractability assumptions.
• Information-theoretic PIR (itPIR) – ensures privacy against compu-
tationally unbounded servers.
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A major issue with computationally-private information retrieval schemes
is that they are resource consuming in terms of computation costs. In fact,
in order to answer a query, a remote service provider must process all of its
entries. Consequently, as pointed out in [158], if the processing algorithm does
not process some records, the server may easily deduce that the requesting
user is not interested in them. This would reveal to the hosting data server
partial information on which record the user is interested in. In the sequel, it is
worth noticing that cPIR schemes are not as private as downloading the whole
database and retrieving locally the desired entry.
PIR schemes are also classified based on the number of hosting server(s). As
such, two mùain categories are distinguished, i.e., single-server PIR [159] and
multi-server PIR, where a set of servers host a distributed replicated databases,
and collaborate to answer clients’ queries.
5.3.2. PIR Applications
PIR schemes have applications in many proposed privacy-sensitive applica-
tions, hence, several works have been proposed [158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165].
For instance, PIR schemes are widely applied for different location-based ser-
vices. The main idea is to retrieve nearest neighbor (NN) point of interest w.r.t.
the user position at the time of his query. In [166], Attallah and Frikken pro-
posed a privacy preserving location-dependent query processing solution. That
is, at the server side, location data are represented through a directed acyclic
graph, w.r.t. points of interest stored by the service provider. However, in order
to resolve a NN query, the user needs to send a number of queries that is pro-
portional to the depth of the graph. Later, Mittal et al. proposed a PIR-Tor, an
architecture for the Tor network in which users obtain information about only
a few onion routers using private information retrieval techniques [160]. Clients
use PIR techniques to download information about only a few relays. PIR pre-
vents untrusted servers from learning any information about the clients’ choices
of relays. Hence, based on this approach, clients’ anonymity is still preserved
while ensuring scalability.
Paulet et al. introduced a novel privacy preserving query-content framework
for location-based services [167]. The proposed framework ensures the privacy
of both the LBS server and the end-user, while relying on two main procedures.
First, an Oblivious Transfer algorithm is performed to map the private location
of the user to a public cell. Second, a PIR algorithm is executed to privately
obtain all the POI records in the designated public cell.
Recently, Ullah et al. introduced Poshida, a private information retrieval pro-
tocol for WSE applications [168]. They propose to obfuscate the user profile
collected and maintained by WSE. Several experiments have been conducted
to measure the profile exposure level with regards to the collected information
by WSE. The authors show that the proposed Poshida protocol is able to hide
up-to 85% of the user profile/attributes from curious entities.
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5.3.3. Searcheable Encryption (SE) Schemes
SE schemes, considered as a server-side privacy enhancing technique, enable
users to delegate keyword search capabilities over encrypted data contents to
remote storage servers without disclosing any plaintext keyword [169, 170]. Any
SE scheme needs to fulfill the following requirements:
• keyword secrecy — the keywords associated with a search query and
encrypted data should not be revealed to any unauthorized entities.
• search pattern secrecy — search pattern is induced by a search query.
The search pattern of a query for keyword W is defined as the information
whether a data file contains this keyword.
• access pattern secrecy — access pattern refers to the information of
search result. By identifying the receiver from the ciphertext, one could
guess the purpose of the ciphertext that would leak important information.
For instance, if a teacher is sending a ciphertext to group of students then
by seeing student category and course names as attributes one has enough
information to determine whether the ciphertext is related to examination,
grading etc. The problem becomes bigger for applications like electronic
health record system and some electronic commerce applications.
Two main SE categories can be distinguished, namely single-owner and
multi-user and multi-owner and multi-user scenarios. On one side, the single-
owner and multi-user category enables a single owner manage his encrypted
data and search capabilities over them [169, 171, 172, 173]. On the other side,
the multi-owner and multi-user scenario enable multiple data owners outsource
their encrypted data to remote servers, such that outsourced data contents are
searchable by multiple users [174, 175, 176].
Some of the single-owner and multi-user based schemes need to grant search
access rights to the users via a shared secret key [169, 170, 173]; while the oth-
ers need to issue search access rights in the form of trapdoors [171]. Recently,
Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) has been used to design authorized key-
word search schemes for multi-owner and multi-user distributed environments.
In [176], the authors use plaintext access policies to encrypt keywords and at-
tributes for authorizing the users. This may reveal sensitive information, like
access and search patterns of a user to the curious remote servers, such as these
information can be used for statistical analysis to break access pattern privacy.
Recently, two main challenging SE design goals should be considered, namely
the support of both multi-keyword queries and results’ ranking for effective data
retrieval, instead of returning undifferentiated results. Indeed, several schemes
have been proposed [161, 162, 163, 164, 165]. In [161], Cao et al. present a
multi-keyword ranked search over encrypted cloud data (MRSE). Among var-
ious multi-keyword semantics, they are based on a similarity measure, called
coordinate matching [177], i.e., as many matches as possible, to capture the
relevance of data documents to the search query. Specifically, [161] used the
inner product similarity [177], i.e., the number of query keywords appearing
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in a document, to quantitatively evaluate such similarity measure of that doc-
ument to the search query. During the index construction, each document is
associated with a binary vector as a sub-index where each bit represents whether
corresponding keyword is contained in the document. The search query is also
described as a binary vector where each bit means whether corresponding key-
word appears in this search request, so the similarity could be exactly measured
by the inner product of the query vector with the data vector. However, directly
outsourcing the data vector or the query vector will violate the index privacy
or the search privacy. To meet the challenge of supporting such multi-keyword
semantic without privacy breaches, Cao et al. propose using secure inner prod-
uct computation, which is adapted from a secure k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN)
technique [178].
5.4. Privacy preserving Computation: Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
As presented in subsection 4.4, privacy preserving computation techniques
permit to protect users’ privacy while processing over their outsourced data
contents. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes, considered as a server-side
privacy technique, allow computation operations to be directly performed on
ciphertexts by mirroring the corresponding operations on the plaintexts. That
is, the decrypted value of computation results on ciphertexts corresponds to the
value of operations on the plaintexts.
Conventionally, privacy preserving techniques can be identified under the
following common setting. Let Alice and Bob be two semi-trusted communi-
cating parties. Bob holds a private function f where Alice has a set of inputs
S, such as S = {x1, · · · , xn}. Alice needs to learn the result of f(S), without
disclosing any information from S.
If the secret function f is designed as a homomorphic function, then, a homo-
morphic encryption scheme can be considered. Indeed, as shown in Figure 9,
Alice first encrypts her inputs’ set and submits it to Bob. In turn, Bob performs
the necessary homomorphic operations upon encrypted inputs and randomizes
the resulting ciphertext before sending it back to Alice. Once the resulting
ciphertext is received, Alice decrypts it and retrieves y = f(x1, · · · , xn).
In 1978, Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzous have introduced the concept of
privacy homomorphism [179]. This promising idea was motivated by the possi-
bility of querying encrypted databases, i.e., the main setting aimed at allowing
each data owner to execute a set of computations (queries, updates, · · · ), while
ensuring that database’ records remain perfectly protected from data leakage
attacks.
Afterwards, several homomorphic constructions emerged and numerous algo-
rithms, mainly designed over algebraic groups or rings appeared [180]. Gener-
ally, systems, defined over groups, support a single operation. Thus, for over 30
years, cryptographic systems, defined over groups, were presented to enable sim-
ple computations over encrypted database, such as Goldwasser and Micali [181],
ElGamal [182], RSA [183] and Paillier [184] schemes. These schemes support
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Figure 9: Homomorphic Encryption Flow Diagram
at the same time.
Concurrently, cryptographic schemes defined over rings usually support two
operations, i.e., addition and multiplication. As such, a cryptographic mech-
anism is considered as homomorphic, if the encryption algorithm is a homo-
morphism, where both the plaintext and ciphertext spaces are groups. In 2005,
Boneh et al. introduced the first concrete construction of a (fully) homomorphic
scheme [185]. Although the proposed scheme permits to perform both opera-
tions at the same time, it is limited to an arbitrary number of additions and
only one multiplication.
5.4.1. Construction of Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
A homomorphic encryption scheme includes four probabilistic algorithms,
namely KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt and Eval. The KeyGen algorithm generates
the public parameters pp and a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk). The
Encrypt algorithm takes as input the public key pk and the message m and out-
puts a ciphertext CT , while the Decrypt algorithm takes as input the ciphertext
CT and the secret key sk and outputs a message m. The Eval algorithm takes
as input an evaluation key evl (i.e., note that the evl key can be considered
as part of the public key pk), a function f : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}, a set of n ci-
phertexts {CT1, · · · , CTn} and it outputs a ciphertext CTf . We note that the
representation of the function f is an important issue, and it is different from
one scheme to another.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes are categorized into ideal
FHE and leveled FHE. An ideal FHE scheme ideally supports calculations for
any circuit, even circuits with an unlimited number of operations on cipher-
texts, while a leveled FHE scheme only supports a limited number of calcula-
tions, based on a given polynomial size circuit. In 2009, Gentry proposed the
first Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), performing an arbitrary number of
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additions and multiplications [111]. Later, further fully homomorphic schemes
were presented [186] [187] [188], [189] following Gentry’s framework. Indeed,
the ideal lattice-based schemes rely on the hard problem of ideal lattice [190],
while schemes defined over integers [186], [188] make use of the hard problem
of the approximate greatest common divisor.
5.4.2. Homomorphic Encryption for Personalized Services
HE schemes have numerous applications [13, 191, 192, 193, 6], based on two
essential properties, namely circuit privacy and multi-hop homomorphism. That
is, the circuit privacy property guarantees that the cloud server inputs, e.g., the
f function, remain privacy protected from the client. A number of variants of
circuit privacy have been introduced in order to ensure data secrecy against ma-
licious users, where users are allowed to know only few elements about function
f , e.g., the size of the circuit. The multi-hop homomorphism property permits
the output of the Eval function to be used by another homomorphic evaluation
function.
HE schemes have widely been applied to recommendation services. In [191],
Erkin et al. proposed a recommendation system based on HE schemes. The
proposed scheme requires encrypting users’ private data, e.g., ratings, items,
etc. relying on Partially Homomorphic Encryption, PHE for short [111]. As
such, the recommender is able to process encrypted inputs without access to
originally enciphered users’ data. In addition, [191] proposal introduces a semi-
trusted third entity to perform some extra-computation on encrypted data, in
order to assist the recommender and prevent collusion between malicious users
and the recommender.
Later, Badsha et al. presented a privacy preserving recommendation scheme
[192], relying on ElGamal encryption scheme [182], without assistance. How-
ever, all entities are obliged to collaborate with the recommender to generate
private recommendation for a target user. Afterwards, the authors proposed
an extended version relying on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) HE scheme [193].
In their proposal, they introduced a third party, to assist users decrypting the
enciphered result returned by the recommending entity.
HE based techniques was also applied to enable private search queries.
That is, the user submits an encrypted query and the remote untrusted server
computes an encrypted answer without ever looking at the query in the clear
[194, 195].
6. Channel Side Techniques
Channel-side techniques encompass mechanisms that may act on the security
and privacy properties of the set-up communication channel between the server
and end-users. They may result in the involvement of a mediating entity, the
encryption or a voluntary degradation of exchanged data.
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Channel-side techniques include secure communications introduced in sub-
section 6.1 and Trusted Third Parties (TTP) presented in subsection 6.2.
6.1. Secure Communications
Generally, physical network links do not ensure sufficient security and privacy
guarantees. Nowadays, in the era of all-connected, it becomes even impossible to
physically prevent pervasive surveillance. Indeed, users’ generated data should
be protected, namely personal information or sensitive user inputs. However,
even access to public resources should be protected through encryption to pre-
vent an attacker from deducing users’ patterns of browsing, profiling, service
use or extracting identifiers that may be used for future tracking.
6.1.1. Client-Service Secure Communications
To secure communications against pervasive surveillance, several service
providers propose to deploy encrypted communication channels. It is important
to emphasize that encrypted channels need to be implemented and configured
correctly, to ensure a sufficient security level.
Several technologies and protocols have been introduced, namely the well-
known Transport Layer Security 1.2 protocol (TLS 1.2)[196] and the Secure
Shell (SSH) protocols [197]. Those technologies provide a confidential and con-
ceivably authenticated channel between users and service providers. Indeed,
deploying TLS 1.2, or an equivalent secure channel, for every network inter-
action should consider currently recommended cipher-suites [198]. Both TLS
and SSH rely on public key cryptography techniques. Consequently, users and
servers are able to set up an encrypted channel with no need to share secrets.
TLS 1.2 is based on a public key certificate infrastructure to ensure the authen-
ticity of the server involved in the communication. Conversely, compromised
authorities may lead to the security of channels being compromised. On the
other side, SSH relies on manual user verification of the service provider’s key,
which is more resource-consuming for end-users. The SSH protocol also requires
to ensure whether end-users are able to perform periodical verification.
A number of technologies may be used for communication within an organ-
isation to ensure the security of transmitted data, as detailed in subsection ??.
For instance, the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [199] permits to create se-
cure communication tunnels between networked machines, or between networks
connected by public network links. It is recommended that traffic internal to an
organisation (local-area network) is encrypted if it may contain user informa-
tion, such as for performing back-ups or communications between application
and database servers [19].
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6.1.2. End-to-End Secure Communications
End-to-end encrypted services refer to encrypted communications between
end-users, meaning that the encryption layer is added at one end-user and is
only cleared at the other end-user. Hence, transmitted data cannot be read by
any third party including the service provider. Several services emerged, such as
Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP), electronic mail or instant messaging and
social networking that settle communications between end-users.
Service providers usually need to assist users to authenticate them, in or-
der to create an end-to-end encrypted channel. However, it is preferable that
the keys used to subsequently ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data
never be available to the service providers, but derived on the end-user devices.
Meanwhile, several service providers may require having some visibility for ei-
ther routing data contents to the correct destination, or providing value added
services, i.e., w.r.t. users’ experience. As such, the minimum amount of infor-
mation should be exposed to service providers.
Web-sites and applications can approximately identify the location of de-
vices, for instance, based on users’ IP addresses. Most IP addresses permit to
report the city or metropolitan area, while others may even refer to more specific
places. Although most tracking mechanisms are mainly deployed at the appli-
cation layer, hiding the original IP address is a well-known solution to avoid
the simple technique of IP addresses’ tracking. The most common method for
hiding the remote site’s IP address is to use virtual private networks (VPNs) or
TOR (The Onion Router), which are introduced hereafter.
• Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) — a VPN is defined as a net-
work technology that creates a secure (encrypted) network connection
over a public network (for example, the Internet) and a private network
of a service provider [200]. The information transmitted between the two
communicating sites through the encrypted tunnel cannot be read by any-
one else because the system relies on several factors to secure the service
provider’s private network and the public network through which the re-
mote user connects.
There are three main network protocols for using VPN tunnels, namely
IPsec, the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) and Layer Two (2)
Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) [199, 201, 202].
Using VPNs, users’ online activities (visited websites, for instance) are
protected against disclosures to third parties. VPNs also avoid the geo-
graphical restrictions of certain services offered over the Internet. How-
ever, it should be noted that the VPN provider may still be able to identify
both the user as well as his online activity.
Several mobile VPN applications have emerged. For instance, Meddle,
which is a mobile tool, has been designed to control the network traffic
from mobile devices by blocking, filtering and modifying it [203]. Using
Meddle, the user can track all the connections established by the mobile
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phone. Meddle enables users to get informed about any access to their
personal data via a dedicated mobile application. This enables the user
to decide whether a particular information should be blocked from being
sent over the network or whether this information needs to be changed.
CyberGhost34 is a full-suite VPN platform, that permits to anonymize and
encrypt users’ online activity while hiding their IP addresses. With an ex-
tensive strategically distributed servers, CyberGhost is a good choice for
Small and Medium Business (SMB), freelancers, and end-users to secure
their online transactions. CyberGhost introduces a user-friendly interface
and offers numerous features, such as IP hiding, a kill switch, malicious
website blocking, etc..
NordVPN35 is a personal VPN service provider. It offers fast connection
speed, worldwide connectivity and safe internet access. With over 4.800
servers worldwide, it offers a robust and dependable online protection,
with ad blocking and most services expected in a VPN provider.
Later, in 2009, the first release of ExpressVPN36 is presented, as a virtual
private network mobile service that encrypts users’ web traffic and hides
their IP addresses. ExpressVPN presents one of the most used mobile
VPNs, since it provides an easy-to-use interface as well as a wide choice
of countries and servers, solid support and lots of security features, e.g.,
network lock kill switch feature, to ensure that users’ activities remain
secure and private.
• The Onion Router (TOR) — anonymization networks are designed
to anonymize Internet communications, i.e., to make it mainly impossi-
ble to identify the communication channel between the end-user and the
corresponding web-server. To provide this functionality, anonymization
networks often rely on a distributed overlay network and onion routing
to anonymize TCP-based applications, such as web browsing or Peer to
Peer (P2P) networks. The most well known anonymizing networks is The
Onion Router, TOR37 for short.
TOR is a network of virtual tunnels designed for anonymous web brows-
ing. In onion routing, a proxy servers’ chain is used to forward user data
to the destination while the proxy link is encrypted. The first proxy in
the chain is called the TOR proxy. It is in charge of randomly selecting
at least 3 different intermediary TOR nodes, called onion routers upto
the destination. Afterwards, the TOR proxy encrypts the message several
times relying on symmetric keys, so that each intermediary TOR node
has to remove one encryption layer for the destination to get the cleart-






succeeding nodes involved in the routing path. Thus, the identity of the
original source remains hidden to anyone who observes the communica-
tion, except over the first hop.
Anonymity protection is the primary scope and functionality of anony-
mous networks. Indeed, they hide the user’s original IP address and/or
other (direct or indirect) identifiers, thus masking his business activity.
There is a fundamental difference between anonymized networks and VPNs.
Indeed, although VPNs can hide the user’s original IP address, they do
not provide anonymity (as the VPN provider is able to identify users of
the service).
A number of technologies have been proposed, implemented and standard-
ised to different extents to provide end-to-end confidentiality. For example, the
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)38 software as well as S/MIME standards [204] may
be used to protect email correspondences end-to-end.
Recently, an end-to-end encrypted e-mail technology, called PreVeil, has been
introduced and patented by Popa et al. [205]. PreVeil is built based public-key
cryptographic primitives. The gist is that every user has a pair of private and
public keys. That is, the sending user has to first encrypt the e-mail under
the receiver’s public key to ensure that it is the only entity allowed to decrypt
it. In addition, PreVeil permits users to access emails on multiple devices by
securely transferring the private key, and also appoint so-called approval groups
to securely recover the private key when lost. In the same vein, several mobile
applications such as Crypto Phone39 and Signal40 have been proposed to pro-
vide end-to-end encrypted communications [206].
In [206], Ermoshina et al. reviewed around 30 end-to-end encrypted mes-
saging protocols, w.r.t. security and privacy guarantees. The analyzed projects
propose several solutions to secure remote data storage. Indeed, despite the
guarantees of no personal information collection, some projects still store im-
portant amounts of data on the servers (i.e., usage statistics, device information,
keys, user-names or friend relations). Hence, it is always explained by empha-
sizing the necessity to propose better user experience based on the collected
usage statistics). A related issue is the powerful double narrative on end-to-end
encryption [206]. On one side, the discourse on empowerment and better pro-
tection of fundamental civil liberties is very strong. On the other side, several
service providers show a need to defend themselves from the encryption is used
by jihadists-type allegations. This narrative is sustained by previous and current
ones about decentralized technologies and peer-to peer, w.r.t. empowering-yet-
illegal tools. These issues are taking place in the broader context of discussions
about governance by infrastructure and users’ privacy preservation, as the Ap-






6.2. Trusted Third Party Mechanisms
For a while, the usage of unique identifiers across wide system, raised a
critical issue. That is, it enables to easily correlate records with no need for
data owners’ consent, introducing several security and privacy issues. Indeed,
a set of curious entities may be made powerful over users with the capabil-
ity to trace them, combine their datasets and infer some information. Even
worse, any data breach reveals fully identifiable and linkable personal infor-
mation. Literally, several mechanisms, relying on the use of anonymizers and
pseudonymisers, emerged. They are known as Trusted Third Party (TTP) tech-
niques [207, 208, 209, 210, 211] and are generally considered under the trusted
model.
Most well known TTP-based techniques are proxy servers, acting as anonymiz-
ers. Proxy servers are intermediary entities placed between communicating par-
ties. Two main types of proxies may be considered (cf. Figure 10):
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Figure 10: Proxy Anonymizing Servers Flow Diagram
• anonymous proxy — it hides the user’s IP address by replacing it by
its own address. However, other entities can conclusively figure out that
a proxy server is set up in the communication.
• high anonymity proxy — similarly to the anonymous proxy, it hides
the client’s IP address by presenting its own address. Furthermore, it also
hides that a proxy is being used in the communication.
The main issues raised by both TTP-anonymizing based techniques is that
personalized services cannot be provided, as TTPs forward data such as queries,
tags, ratings associated to several users, to the corresponding service providers.
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In addition, the tracking problem is shifted to the proxy servers’ level, as the
matching of all pseudonyms, queries and results is performed at this level.
Concurrently, several approaches, called pseudonym systems, have been pro-
posed. In fact, they rely on cryptographic methods to generate different context-
specific pseudonyms that are unlinkable. In order to enable associating different
outsourced data sets, a central entity, can later be asked to associate pseudonyms
to a specific user on a case per case basis [212].
A pseudonym system is an interesting solution that permits to guarantee au-
ditability and ensure confidentiality of data w.r.t. involved entities. In fact,
each user is able to generate a number of pseudonyms, derived from his private
key and arbitrary scope strings. He is, then, able to prove that he knows the
secret key used to derive this pseudonym. As detailed in [212], a pseudonym
system has to fulfill three main security properties: the key extractability, col-
lision resistance and unlinkability. First, key extractability ensures that service
providers are guaranteed that a honest user effectively knows the used secret key
to derive such pseudonym (respectively proof). Second, the collision resistance
property guarantees that for each context, any two users should have different
pseudonyms with probability. Finally, unlinkability ensures that users cannot be
linked/identified across contexts. That is, similar to several TTP-anonymizing
techniques, relying on pseudonyms systems, the service provider cannot deduce
the identity of the user, but merely the identity of the third party involved in the
communication. However, as the trusted entity is the main central entity, it can
easily correlate data with their respective users, while tracing users’ activities,
based on data exchanges.
Recently, Camenisch and Lehmann [207] presented a blind-convertor system
(i.e., the convertor is the central entity), where the conversion process, executed
by the convertor, is performed in a privacy-preserving (i.e., anonymous and un-
linkable) fashion, with no need for learning the pseudonyms or the identity of
the concerned user. The authors extended their work by presenting in [210] a
system where user-centric audits are set-up by an oblivious convertor, which
is still the main central entity. This appended auditability feature is a very
important property, for compliance with legal and business requirements [4].
While several systems permit to satisfy transparency and auditability re-
quirements based on a user-centric fashion, a Blockchain-based Data Usage
Auditing system, BDUA, is proposed in [211]. The proposed system ensures
a controlled yet privacy preserving exchange of distributed data, such that a
set of authorized auditing entities are able to conduct an accurate auditing ac-
tivity relying on registered blockchains’ transactions . The BDUA scheme is
an unlinkable pseudonym system where a selected convertor obviously collab-
orates with each user to derive individual pseudonyms for each server. That
is, the convertor cannot learn the derived pseudonyms, but is still the only en-
tity that can link pseudonyms together without learning the particular user or
pseudonym for which such translation is requested. It also provides an accurate
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privacy-preserving auditing process based on blockchain transactions.
Table 5 presents a comparison between several pseudonym schemes, w.r.t.
functional requirements.
Table 5: Comparison between pseudonym schemes
Scheme blind conversion multi-convertor user auditing public auditing
[208] × × X X
[209] × × X X
[207] X × × ×
[210] X × X ×
[211] X X X X
X and × indicate respectively whether the requirement is achieved or not.
To ensure privacy-preserving personalized identity-management systems for
healthcare applications, another approach introduced by Verheul et al. in [213]
consists on the development of Polymorphic Encryption and Pseudonymisation
(PEP for short). Based on the PEP technology, end-users send their data con-
tents in polymorphically encrypted form to service providers. When needed,
each end-user is able to make (parts of) these data available (decryptable) for
some particular/selected entities, for specific analysis purposes. Consequently,
users remain in control, and can monitor which parts of their outsourced data
are used where, by whom and for which purposes. To resolve the privacy-
personalization trade-off, the authors introduce the polymorphic pseudonym
system that permits each end-user to automatically have different pseudonyms
at different contexts. These pseudonyms can only be de-pseudonymised by au-
thorized entities (e.g., medical doctors) who know the original identity of the
end-user. An open source prototype implementation of the PEP framework is
made available41. Several experiments are actually conducted in a real-life med-
ical research project at the Radboud University Medical Center in Nijmegen,
The Netherlands.
7. Comparison between PETs
Table 6 provides a detailed comparison between the reviewed PETs, w.r.t.
involved approaches, supported trust and architectural models, main drawbacks,
suitability for personalized services and supported use cases. In the following,
we discuss summarized approaches w.r.t. two factors: trust model based classi-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1. Trust Model based Discussion
From Table 6, we note that three prominent approaches are considered under
the trusted model, namely the TTP schemes, client-service secure communica-
tions and VPNs as a network-level anti-tracking tool.
Note that a VPN-driven communication can also blend under client-service
secure communications’ approaches [18] as both of them are relying on a secure
channel enabling to mitigate external adversaries that try to get extra-knowledge
from exchanged information. However, while a VPN-driven communication ends
at a VPN provider, a client-service secure communication ends at the service
provider. This means that a VPN-driven solution requires the user to trust
the VPN provider of his choice and to manage the secure channel in between.
For the client-service secure communications, a user is required to trust each
service provider he is interacting with, and to establish a secure channel rely-
ing on external PKI entities he is also required to trust. Like VPN solutions,
the TTP approaches consider a trustworthy intermediary server which, unlike
VPNs, is anonymizing or pseudonymizing the traffic. Note that TTP schemes
and client-service communications are still widely deployed techniques to pro-
vide some privacy-enhancing services [18, 210, 198, 19]. As stated in Section 6.2,
TTP-anonymizing based techniques cannot provide personalized services, as in-
termediate servers are usually deployed to mix data associated to several data
i.e., queries, ratings, etc. before forwarding to service providers. Meanwhile,
new emerging convertor-based systems relying on pseudonym systems can be
deployed for some pervasive applications to resolve the privacy-personnalization
trade-off, namely for data transfer scenarios [211]. Conversely, client-server se-
cure communications enable personalized services, mainly for private web-search
services and/or a set of pervasive applications e.g., e-commerce and e-banking
services. Based on the trust relationship between customers and their service
providers, they support services that are highly adapted to users’ usages and
preferences, but offer no protection against curious providers.
Semi-trusted models include six different techniques, deployed either on the
client side or the server side. They involve application-level anti-tracking tools
and privacy-preserving certification schemes for the user-side techniques and
Statistical Disclosure Control, PIR solutions, self-destructing data systems and
homomorphic encryption schemes for the server-side techniques.
All these different techniques assume that service providers are honest in the
sense that they genuinely perform the computations expected from protocols.
However, they are curious as they try to infer any extra-information to closely
identify and/or profile users [6]. Specifically, obfuscation and homomorphic en-
cryption are adapted to applications requiring search over data stored on third
party servers such as cloud storage services [214] or content delivery networks
[215]. Statistical Disclosure Control techniques and privacy preserving certifi-
cation schemes are mostly adapted to well-being applications such as e-health
applications. For instance, data can be collected from authenticated users while
preserving their personal data.
PETs, considered under the semi-trusted model, mostly rely on the client-
server architectural model. Consequently, each client, at his level, goes to tech-
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niques that disclose the minimum amount of identifying information to their
service providers, thus, preventing them to build precise users’ profiles. In the
sequel, these mechanisms generally suffer from privacy-utility trade-offs, such
that they may not be adapted to several personalized services (i.e., web search
applications). However, they are still promising solutions for pervasive applica-
tions, namely vehicular and geo-social applications [45, 139].
Finally, four different techniques are considered under the untrusted model
namely network-level anti-tracking tools i.e., TOR, secure multi-party com-
putation schemes, end-to-end secure communications and perturbation tech-
niques. Most of these techniques rely on distributed architectures, except for
anti-tracking tools. In fact, anti-tracking are deployed under the client-server
model, where each end-user is in charge of setting up appropriate tools to prevent
the disclosure of extra-personal data [48]. Although providing perfect privacy,
they are not adapted to personalized services, as they hide any useful informa-
tion that help to build users’ profiles, from service providers. Similarly, privacy
preserving computation and end-to-end communications, based on distributed
architectures, provide non-personalized services to end-users. In addition, they
generate high computational and communication overheads, due to the num-
ber of participating parties that need to cooperate. Thus, they are suitable
to many pervasive applications and services, involving resource-constrained de-
vices [19, 104, 106, 115]. SMC techniques are suitable in smart cities appli-
cations which do not involve resource constrained devices. For instance, these
techniques can be applied to collect data from smart homes in order to monitor
energy consumption without leaking private data about users [106]. End-to-end
communications are widely applied in messaging applications to ensure private
communications between participants [206].
7.2. Use-Case based Discussion
From Table 6, we note that PETs can be classified into two main families,
w.r.t. their ability to support personalization features. That is, the first family
is not adapted to personalized services while the second one can be adapted to
several settings, applications and environments permitting to provide privacy-
preserving personalized services.
On one side, the first family, non-adapted to personalized services, involve
four different approaches, namely self-destructing systems, PIR solutions, end-
to-end secure communications and a set of anti-tracking tools, mainly TOR and
some anti-cookies tools. Most of these techniques are deployed, in case end-
users are concerned about their privacy and do not trust their service providers.
Thus, they choose to gain privacy preservation while giving up personalized
services ease. While some techniques, like self-destructing systems or PIR so-
lutions, require the honest processing and collaboration of the service providers
to guarantee full privacy, they are not adapted to personalized services.
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On the other side, the second family includes techniques that are adapted
to different categories of personalized services.
First, PETs adapted to web search include three prominent approaches, i.e.,
SMC schemes, client-server secure communications and SDC approaches. Al-
though the two first techniques are based on different architectural and trust
models, they both guarantee the privacy-preserving search feature. Thus, they
counteract data leakages by curious providers and external attackers respec-
tively. For instance, in a secure collaborative computing setting, a set of users
co-operate to send an aggregated query to the web-search provider, instead of
sending individual queries. The main issues of this approach comprise the high
computation and communication overhead and the relevance of returned results
that mainly depend on the homogeneity of the profiles of group’s members.
Note that application-level anti-tracking tools, i.e., anti-cookies, are also widely
installed by end-users. However, as explained in section 4.1, tracker-blockers do
not necessarily provide privacy of end-users against curious providers. They are
used in most-cases to block undesirable ads and pop-up advertisements.
Differently, SDC approaches are extensively deployed by web-search providers to
ensure the privacy of their clients, by anonymizing users’ stored queries. These
databases are very essential for web-search providers and are used for statisti-
cal and economic purposes. Thus, SDC presents the main deployed server-side
techniques, as they permit to resolve the privacy-utility trade-off and they afford
providers to escape the GDPR [4] regulation as anonymized data are no longer
processed as personal data.
Second, techniques adapted to pervasive applications mainly involve five ap-
proaches, i.e., privacy preserving certification mechanisms, data perturbation
solutions, SDC techniques and privacy preserving computation including SMC
and HE schemes. In ubiquitous environments, the choice of the most efficient
PET depends on both trust and architectural models. For instance, smart-cities
applications, considered under opportunistic networks, generally rely on users’
collaborative secure computation schemes, while other e-commerce applications,
considered under a client-server architecture, generally rely on privacy preserv-
ing certification or secure C-S communications.
Third, techniques adapted to recommendation systems include three main
approaches namely data perturbation solutions, secure multi-party computation
techniques and homomorphic encryption schemes. As detailed in section 3.1,
recommendation services enable users to receive diverse personalized recommen-
dations, w.r.t. their close interests, mainly via an entity or a set of entities, called
recommender(s). Thus, to preserve their privacy while ensuring an acceptable
processing and communication overhead, data perturbation is considered as one
of the leading PETs. Indeed, it is achieved through the injection of dummy
data records/ratings or the suppression of redundant/non-genuine ones. While
data perturbation is a very interesting approches to enhance privacy of users,
it suffers from the privacy-utility trade-off, and several works proposed to ana-
lytically study the impact of the adoption of those methods [100].
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Even if most of the reviewed techniques and approaches permit to provide
privacy-preserving personalized services in various domains and environments,
it is almost unpredictable which technologies would raise new privacy issues in
the future. Thus, it is important to consider efficient privacy metrics to envision
the privacy-personalization intersection set [15, 16]. In addition, the emerged
new data analysis technologies may provide new burdens between efficient per-
sonalization techniques and privacy (further discussion is provided in Section 8).
For instance, data centers are now able to process large amounts of data, thus
increasing the possibilities to infer new data through data crossing with other
services and applications. Considering powerful personalization techniques, de-
ployed by Google, Facebook or even Amazon, enhanced by the huge databases
of users’ profiles they are holding, it is trivial that these companies may provide
relevant and accurate contents and services to their clients. As predictions on
users’ preferences are more and more precise, data leakage attacks will conse-
quently drive critical concerns (more details are discussed in Section 8).
8. Open Issues and Research Challenges
From the recently mediated privacy violations, it is to be noted that both
research results are still at their early-stage (i.e., not yet providing operational
products) and solutions to privacy violations are seemingly beyond effective
technical implementations. Indeed, efficient privacy preserving techniques need
to meet a set of transversal legal and economic requirements while improving
end-users’ experience.
8.1. Technical Challenges
Considering identified privacy properties, presented in section 2, several tech-
nical challenges need to be further investigated. In this section, we point out
some technical open issues and we give various research directions.
8.1.1. Privacy-sensitive Auditing Tools
A minority of works addressed transparency, a.k.a. auditing concerns, which
have been emphasized by recent regulations and laws [210, 211, 216, 217]. For
instance, in [210], Camenisch et al. introduce a controlled yet privacy preserv-
ing exchange of distributed data scheme, such that each data owner is able
to conduct an accurate auditing relying on a public logging system. Nowadays,
blockchain applications are becoming increasingly prevalent, to several use-cases
and scenarios namely for highly distributed and decentralized settings. The phi-
losophy underlying the blockchain technology is that records are shared by all
network nodes, updated by miners, monitored by everyone, and owned and con-
trolled by no one [218, 219]. In 2018, in [211], an accurate privacy-preserving
auditing process based on blockchain transactions is proposed. The auditing
scheme may be conducted by the data owner himself and/or a set of autho-
rized entities. The auditing process is achieved thanks to transactions being
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registered by each of the involved participating entity, and enciphering of link-
ing information with respect to a multi-level attribute based encryption. De-
spite the expressiveness and power of the blockchain and smart contracts, the
present form of these technologies lacks transactional privacy. The whole
sequence of actions provided at the smart contract are propagated across the
network and/or recorded on the blockchain. Thus, they are publicly visible.
Even though entities are able to generate new pseudonymous public keys to
increase their anonymity, the values of all transactions and balances for each
(pseudonymous) public key are publicly visible. Further, recent works have also
demonstrated de-anonymization attacks by analyzing the transactional graph
structures of cryptocurrencies [220, 221]. The lack of privacy is a major concern
towards the wide adoption of blockchains, mainly for financial transactions that
are considered by many individuals and organizations as being highly secret.
To mitigate these concerns, several approaches emerged [222, 223, 224, 225].
On one side, privacy-preserving crypto-currencies and confidential transactions,
appeared [224, 223]. On the other side, privacy preserving smart contracts have
been introduced [222, 225]. To bring privacy to smart contracts, non-interactive
zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs have been proposed as a tool to enable complex
smart contracts that do not leak the user inputs [222, 226].
8.1.2. Privacy-sensitive Data Collection and Inference
Machine Learning (ML) techniques have been widely considered as an effi-
cient and powerful AI approach to support contents and services’ personaliza-
tion. That is, ML techniques enable to collect and infer accurate information
about users and thus building representative user’s profiles, based on their in-
terests, movements and habits. Hence, various works applied ML mechanisms
for personalized recommendation services, web-search engines and a lot of per-
vasive applications [227, 228, 229, 230]. Several solutions mainly stressed on
systems’ performances and omitted privacy issues that may be raised due the
massive collection of users’ data.
The main idea in proposed private Machine Learning solutions consists in
two steps. First, a ML model is urged to collect users’ data in a privacy preserv-
ing fashion. Commonly, the process of inductive learning (by the machine) can
be explained as a search process for general descriptions aiming at predicting
output data based on the analyzed input data. Second, the designed model
is used to generate personalized services [231, 232]. Thus, the main concern
consists in defining privacy-enhancing cryptographic methods to meet an agree-
ment between privacy, efficiency and quality of experience. Indeed, very limited
works have presented interesting results to achieve a good trade-off. Indeed,
recent advances in cryptographic systems have to be applied while considering
both efficiency and effectiveness [233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 217].
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8.1.3. Privacy-sensitive Techniques for Ubiquitous Environments
Mobile personalized services are gaining an expanding interest, following the
ubiquity ability of mobile devices. However, due to the resource-constrained
environments under consideration, the design of security and privacy-enhancing
techniques require lightweight mechanisms, in order to achieve satisfying user-
experience in mobile personalized applications and services [238, 236].
Therefore, it is important to investigate new research directions for devel-
oping and designing lightweight privacy preserving personalized applications,
w.r.t. processing and communication overheads, adapted to limited-resources
devices. One possible direction involves advanced trusted hardware, namely In-
tel Software Guard Extensions, i.e., Intel SGX42. This trusted hardware is able
to ensure secure computations with minimal processing overhead.
In addition, energy consumption has to be taken into consideration during the
design of security mechanisms for mobile services. It is agreed that battery
energy is one of the most critical resource of mobile devices [13]. Indeed, bat-
tery energy represents the main functional factor that straightly affects the user
experience. Furthermore, there is a need for an accurate prediction of adver-
saries’ knowledge. In fact, very protective techniques, based on conservative
assumptions, can engender high computational costs and communication over-
head while leading to inefficient quality of service. In [239], Canetti formalized
the concept of Universally Composable (UC) security for proving the security of
a complex system provided with many interactions between entities and algo-
rithms. In a nutshell, when relying on UC security, the execution of a designed
protocol is compared to the execution of an ideal protocol. The designed proto-
col is considered as UC-secure, if its execution is stable w.r.t. the ideal protocol
execution instance. Based on this definition, [239] formulates a composition
theorem that states that any UC-secure protocol is also secure if it is composed
of other UC-secure protocols [240].
8.2. User Experience Challenges
User experience is the main pillar to both defining the perimeter of private
information and the utility over the adoption of PETs. Regarding the first
concern, several mediated cases in the past, such as Kodak cameras43, Google
glasses44 or LG-TV45, revealed how much data can be intrusively collected about
people, with a vague but threatening picture related to possible subsequent
exploitation and consequences over peoples’ life. The perception of which data
can be released, to which entities, differs from one user to another, depending









survey, covering around 2, 000 representative French Web users, was conducted
in view of analyzing the impact of abusive data collection practices on users’
attitudes [241]. The survey showed that Web users tend to become more vigilant,
willing to share part of personal data according to the service category (bank,
social media, purchasing web site, mobile operator, etc.). Moreover, the survey
revealed that 10% of web users would prefer not to share any of their data if they
had the choice. As a consequence, the first challenge is to be able to conceive
solutions that permit to provide flexible protection adaptable to each user’s
preferences and contexts. The second challenge is to find a compromise between
users’ privacy, efficient users’ experience and data utility [233, 234, 235]. For
instance, in [234], privacy is modeled relying on negative utility associated with
each released information. Thus, based on each user’s knowledge, Massaguer et
al. [234] proposed a distributed solution that permits to maximize the utility of
released information while meeting the privacy requirements of users. Recently,
Wang et al. studied dependencies between sensitive data and useful data [235].
They proposed closed-analytic formal expressions for the privacy-utility tradeoffs
for dependent sensitive and useful information w.r.t. mutual data and Hamming
distortion as the respective privacy and utility metrics.
Another key aspect for better user experience is to provide ergonomic and
user-friendly applications, so the users do not go through complex settings for
adapting the technology to their own preferences. In addition, as discussed in
subsection 8.1, the provision of transparency and monitoring tools are of im-
portant interest, for helping users verifying whether their data are processed
according to their expressed privacy preferences, and for getting users’ confi-
dence.
8.3. Legal Challenges
The GDPR is not the only legal text to take into consideration. Several
regulations are currently under discussion at the European (EU) level, mainly
the proposal for EU regulations on the free circulation of data (non-personal
data46) and the e-Privacy regulation proposal47 [242]. Indeed, [242] raises vig-
orous negotiations between the stakeholders on which data can be qualified as
non-personal (vs personal), and the definition of a mixed data set (both personal
and non-personal). The objective of the e-Privacy proposal is to extend the Di-
rective on Privacy and Electronic Communications (Directive 2002/58/EC) to
Over-The-Top services like WhatsApp and to metadata. In an undetermined
future due to the vigorous negotiations, e-Privacy Regulation is expected to be a
lex specialis added to the new GDPR, enforced since May, 25th, 2018. However,
46Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework
for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union, Brussels, 13.9.2017, COM(2017)
495 final.
47Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the
respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and
repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications),
Brussels, 10.1.2017.
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it seems that this goal will not be achieved, mainly because of intense lobbying
and the upcoming elections of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).
With regard to the privacy-preserving personalized services, one has to un-
derstand which text should apply to which category of approaches. For in-
stance, approaches like anonymization and obfuscation (i.e., data perturbation)
leading to revealing anonymized data to the providers are within the scope of
the GDPR, such as requirement and compliance of the providers to respect
privacy-preserving computation, privacy-preserving certification providing only
encrypted personal data. Finally, whatever the solution, as metadata are re-
vealed, providers are required to conform to e-Privacy. E-Privacy also adds a
PET per default to internet browser and to electronic communications devices.
With the perspective of conducting auditing activities, it is of interest and
challenging from a technical point of view, to conceive useful auditing tools.
These tools permit to guarantee users, in a user-friendly way, that their con-
sent is respected during data collection, processing, storage and analysis and
organizations that they comply with their accountability obligation. Moreover,
according to the use cases, some technical inspection procedures are required
for re-identifying a malicious user, which raise challenging issues due to the
multitude of auditing parties (i.e., data owners, authorized authorities, · · · ),
and fulfill several GDPR requirements, mainly the obligation of integrity and
confidentiality, the principles of data protection by default and the right to be
forgotten or in general privacy by design enforced by the GDPR.
8.4. Economic Challenges
Several challenges to adopt privacy-preserving technologies by economic ac-
tors, are identified. Analyzing the survey conducted on French web users [241],
the authors stated that from an economic point of view, users’ behaviors reflect-
ing an outright refusal to share their personal data represent a risk which cannot
be ignored by data driven firms. However, it is important to note that individ-
ual protection strategies (management of digital identities, ad blockers’ settings,
accounts’ privacy parameters) may also stimulate economic activities. For in-
stance, the widespread use of PETs, seen as a threat by publishers, is in fact
accompanied by an increase in economic online activities such as e-commerce.
Indeed, studies such as [243] shows that Internet users with privacy concern that
have installed PETs are purchasing more frequently on Internet. Giving people
a means of protecting themselves could strengthen their subjective feeling of in-
dividual empowerment. First, in order to meet new regulations’ requirements,
it may be necessary to re-design or at least revise actual information systems
by data processors and collectors, thus leading to extra costs. Indeed, they may
eventually be required to adjust their Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) [244],
or bear labels’ costs. Even higher costs are required to actually conceive and
deploy the privacy-by-design principle.
Second, several privacy preserving techniques rely on reduced amounts of col-
lected personal information. Thus, mainly Small and Medium Enterprises (SME)
do suffer from the incompatibility between their business models and data min-
imisation requirements, pushing them to review their planning for current and
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future projects [245].
Third, SMEs mainly suffer from the problem of collecting users’ consents be-
cause they do not directly interact with customers.
9. Conclusion
This paper reviews PETs technologies under concrete considerations of some
updated applications and services which require user-based personalization.
First, a classification of such services is proposed, along with their respective
privacy threats, adversaries and requirements, after a short analysis of their
inherent privacy issues. Second, a taxonomy of Privacy Enhancing Technolo-
gies (PETs) is presented where three different groups and eight categories have
been identified, according to which entity is mainly involved in the privacy-
preserving decision, which entity is supporting the main cost for privacy, and
whether the channel between the client and the server is involved. Indeed, user-
side, server-side and channel side techniques are detailed w.r.t. to eight families
namely: anti-tracking, anonymous certification, privacy preserving computa-
tion, self-destructing systems, secure communications, trusted third parties and
obfuscation techniques. The paper reviews each of these families with the main
approaches available in the literature or in industrial solutions, and it establishes
a comparison among them, based on the trust models being supported, and the
services of interest that could implement such PET technologies. Afterwards,
the remaining challenges about the users’ privacy preservation are discussed
under the multi-disciplinary prism, considering technical, social (i.e., user ex-
perience), legal and economic concerns. Finally, several research directions are
identified, namely privacy sensitive data collection mechanisms, with a focus
on the usage of ML techniques, privacy-preserving auditing platforms and the
ubiquity-efficiency trade-offs.
PETs are promising technologies that fulfill users’ requirements regarding
privacy especially with the emergence of privacy legislation while enabling ser-
vice providers and third parties (e.g., advertising companies) to provide optimal
user experience and quality of service. Nevertheless, as the trade-off between
privacy preservation and personalized services has not been solved yet, PETs
are slowly adopted by companies. Thus, further research efforts have to be made
in order to apply PETs in real world applications.
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Optimal tag suppression for privacy protection in the semantic web, Data
& Knowledge Engineering 81 (2012) 46–66.
[100] J. Parra-Arnau, D. Rebollo-Monedero, J. Forné, Optimal forgery and sup-
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